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INTRODUCTION
Sexual violence has received considerable attention in the last decade. In
the wake of several high profile incidents and on the heels of increasing
awareness of violence against women, legislatures across the country have
enacted a bevy of laws aimed at those who perpetrate forcible rape. Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") which provides a civil
rights action for victims of sexual violence based on gender animus.' It further
amended the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"), altering its longstanding ban
on character evidence in criminal proceedings to allow admission of
"propensity" evidence in trials of sex offenders. 2 Both the Congress and
several state legislatures enacted statutes requiring authorities to notify the
public of registered sex offenders.3 A number of states passed laws requiring
indefinite civil commitment of sexual predators.4  Although the specific
motivations behind each law differ, they unite in their desire to protect the
public against men who rape.5
Given the very real harms of rape and the fact that "[n]inety-eight percent of
42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995). ("[T]he purpose of this part [is] to protect ... civil
fights... by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of
violence motivated by gender." Id. § 13981(a)). The civil rights remedy is but one of a
multitude of statutory provisions included in the Violence Against Women Act. See
generally id. at §§ 13931-14040. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 is codified in
Titles 18 and 42 of the United States Code. The referenced portion in Title 42 contains six
Parts that legislate Safe Streets for Women, Safe Homes for Women, Civil Rights for
Women, Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, Violence Against Women Act
Improvements, and National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction. See Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
2 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2136-37 (1994) (enacting Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415)
(permitting the admission of evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases (FRE 413)
and child molestation cases (FRE 414), and of similar acts in civil cases concerning sexual
assault or child molestation (FRE 415)).
3 See infra notes 13, 22 for citations to the federal registration statute and the registration
statutes of 47 states.
4 See infra note 34 for citations to 16 state statutes requiring indefinite civil commitment
for sexual predators.
I The laws described apply to a variety of sexual offenses, ranging from forcible rape to
statutory rape to child molestation. Virtually all such laws, however, cover at least the
crime of forcible rape. This article is concerned with the laws as they primarily relate to that
crime. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209, infra note 73, for a definition of
forcible rape.
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the victims of rape never see their attacker caught, tried and imprisoned,"'6 one
might argue that the new legislation is needed. After all, society has not
always been receptive to victims' claims of rape. Decades of rape scholarship
chronicle obstacles to prosecution of this crime, including onerous legal
requirements 7 and invidious societal stereotypes regarding rape victims.
8
Feminist reformers spent nearly thirty years trying to eradicate these legal and
social barriers to prosecution-in effect trying to convince the public and the
legal system to take rape seriously. That these new laws demonstrate a serious
attempt to increase the prosecution, conviction, and punishment for rape is
arguably cause for rejoicing among feminists.
In reality, these new laws substantially undermine feminist efforts. They do
so by reinforcing the myth that men who rape are "brutish male
aggressor[s] ... [and] sex crazed deviant sociopath[s] ... [who are] violent
and sadistic [and] us[e] extreme force to violate [their] victim."9  Modem
social science data debunks this myth and suggests that the average rapist is
psychologically normal.' 0 Moreover, many studies suggest that most women
know their rapists and that only a small portion of rapes involve violence
6 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103RD CONG., 1 ST SESS., THE RESPONSE TO
RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE iii (Comm. Print 1993).
7 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1135, 1138 (1986) [hereinafter
Estrich, Rape] (discussing the legal requirement that the female victim prove nonconsent by
"utmost resistance" or "reasonable physical resistance," and a common cautionary jury
instruction regarding possible false accusations); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1013, 1041-46 (1991) [hereinafter Torrey, Rape Myths] (discussing prompt complaint
requirement, also known at common law as "immediate outcry," and the historical origins of
the "false accusation" jury instruction in rape trials); Dawn M. Dubois, Note, A Matter of
Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087,
1087-91, 1098-99 (1988) (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration
requirements); Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert
Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96
(discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements).
8 Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1017-37 (discussing four categories of rape
myths, their acceptance by society, and the media's role in fostering these stereotypes); Toni
M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue
and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 404 (1985)
(discussing the persistence of rape mythology that "insidiously infect[s] the minds of jurors,
judges, and others").
9 Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 677-78 (1998); see also JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A.
HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 118 (1981) (discussing study
finding that most people believe rapists are "crazy").
'0 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy
In Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 576-78 (1997) (reviewing social science data
regarding the "normality" of rapists).
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extrinsic to the rape itself.I I While a significant part of the feminist agenda has
been the deconstruction of this myth, especially as it relates to the campaign
for public recognition that "acquaintance rape" is also forcible rape, the "myth
of the crazed rapist" remains deeply entrenched.12
The recent rape legislation is rooted in and reinforces the myth of the crazed
rapist. Registration, notification, and sexual predator laws are clearly based on
this myth. Supporters of these laws have expressly embraced the notion that
those who rape are unusually dangerous recidivists against whom society must
be on constant guard. VAWA and the new FRE amendments-legislation at
least partly grounded in feminist notions regarding the need to demolish
societal barriers to rape prosecution-also accept the image of the crazed
rapist. Ultimately, the new legislation's acceptance of this myth undercuts the
feminist agenda with respect to rape. First, the legislation applies a scheme
intended to apply to the crazed rapist situation to all rapes. The disconnection
between the laws' application and the myth that propels them encourages
courts to distinguish the paradigm rapist from those "normal" men who may be
guilty of rape but who do not fit the paradigmatic image. Second, to the extent
that some of the legislation is confined to certain "extremely dangerous"
offenders, the criteria for such an assessment often reflect stereotypical and
false assumptions about rape. These errors then encourage courts to
distinguish between "real" rapists and other rapists. In both situations,
reinforcement of the image of the crazed rapist as the "real" rapist undermines
feminist efforts to gain public recognition that acquaintance rape is rape, a
concrete and serious harm.
Part I of this article reviews these new legislative provisions, discussing
their requirements as well as the general impetus behind their enactment. Part
II discusses both the history of rape prosecution and feminist efforts in the
1970s and 1980s to eliminate barriers to successful rape prosecutions. This
part also elaborates upon the myth of the crazed rapist and its relationship to
feminist reform efforts. Part III explains how the current legislation is rooted
in and reinforces that myth by encouraging unsupportable distinctions among
rape defendants. Finally, Part IV discusses the feminist response to such laws
and argues for a more concerted feminist outcry against them. It further argues
for either repeal or substantial restructuring of the new legislation, approaches
that are most consistent with the feminist agenda regarding rape.
NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER AND CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER,
RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA]
(summarizing results of the National Women's Survey); see also infra notes 129, 143, 144.
12 DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 82-86 (1974)
(discussing rape by lovers); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1092-93 (citing feminist writers
who assert "that most of what passes for 'sex' in our capitalist society is coerced").
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I. RECENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES REGARDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN
A. Laws Requiring Registration and Notification Regarding Sexual
Offenders
The most widespread forms of the new legislation, which have proliferated
in all fifty states and at the federal level, are statutes requiring registration and
public notification of registered sex offenders. In 1994, Congress enacted the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program, which requires states to establish a registration system
for persons convicted of certain sexual offenses in order to receive federal
funds. 13 The federal law also obligates states to enact certain registration
periods for offenders, 14 to gather certain information from registrants, 15 and to
enforce penalties for an offender's failure to register.' 6  Although the
registration program originally contained permissive notification provisions, 7
Congress amended the statute in 1997 to require that state and local authorities
notify the public of registered sex offenders present in local communities. 18
Specifically, the federal law directs states to notify the public about those
persons who commit violent sexual offenses 19 or offenses against minors20 and
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring sexually violent offenders to
register their current addresses after release from incarceration). States failing to initiate
sexual offender registration programs are denied ten percent of the funds they would
otherwise have received as federal grants for assistance with law enforcement. Those funds
are then reallocated to other States that do comply with the law. See id. § 14071(g)(2).
14 Id. § 14071 (b)(6) (ranging from ten years to life according to the offense).
15 The federal act requires states to inform an offender, upon release from incarceration,
that he must provide certain information to local law enforcement personnel, including
fingerprints, photographs, addresses, and future changes of residence. The act also requires
the state to provide the registration information to the local. law enforcement agency that has
jurisdiction over the released offender's residence. See id. §§ 14071(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A),
(b)(2), (b)(4).
6 See id. § 14071(d) (enacting criminal penalties for offenders who fail to register or do
not keep their registrations current).
" See id. § 14071(d)(3) (permitting the state to release information to the public about
registered offenders).
18 See id. § 14071(e)(2) (requiring that the State "release relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public").
19 See id. § 14071(a)(1)(A) (requiring registration of persons convicted of a sexually
violent offense against anyone). Sexually violent offenses includes the crime of rape as
defined by state law or §§ 2241 and 2242 of Title 18 of the U.S.C.A. See id. §
14071 (a)(3)(B). For example, the federal registration act covers an offender who knowingly
"causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person
in fear... or [who] engages in a sexual act with another person... [who] is ... incapable
of appraising the nature of the conduct ... or ... physically incapable of declining
participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act." 18
20011
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those who are sexual predators. 21 Other than these minimal requirements,
Congress granted the states great discretion to implement the registration and
notification requirements.
Since the enactment of the federal law and its persuasive funding provisions,
nearly all states have substantially similar registration laws. 22 Reflecting the
U.S.C.A. § 2242(1)-(2) (West 2000).
20 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring registration of
persons convicted of a criminal offense against a minor). While the statute is targeted
toward individuals who have committed sexual offenses, an offender can be deemed to have
committed a criminal offense against a child not only through sexual conduct with a child,
but also through kidnapping, false imprisonment of a minor or other sexually oriented
conduct towards a minor. See id. § 14071(a)(3)(A) (listing the stated crimes and excepting
perpetrators no older than eighteen years).
21 See id. § 14071(a)(l)(B). A sexually violent predator is an individual "convicted of a
violent sexual offense who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." Id. §
14071 (a)(3)(C). The main point of the sexually violent predator designation is to signal that
the offender is subject to stricter registration and notification requirements. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 14071(b)(1)(B), 14071(b)(6)(B) (West 2000) (including documentation of
treatment for the psychiatric disorder and prolonging the registration requirement until the
person "no longer suffers" from the psychiatric disorder that made "the person likely to
engage in a predatory sexually violent offense").
22 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.835 to 11.56.840,
12.63.010 to 12.63.100, 18.65.087, 28.05.048, 33.30.035 (Michie 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 13-3824 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-
901 to 12-12-920 (Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2000);
COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-412.5 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-252 to 54-260 (1999); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch.
775.21 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-2 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to 18-8326
(1997 & Supp. 1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§
5-2-12-1 to 5-2-12-5 (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1 to 692A.16 (West
2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to 22-4910 (West 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
17.500 to 17.540 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540 to 15:549
(West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to 11005, tit. 16, § 612 (West
Supp.1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6 §§ 178C-178P (West Supp. 2000); MD. ANN.
CODE of 1957 art. 27, § 792 (Michie 1996 & Lexis Supp. 2000); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 28.721 to 28.732 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1992 & Supp. 1999);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to 45-33-21 (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 589.400
to 589.425 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to 46-23-512
(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179B.010 to 179B.260, 179D.010 to 179D.220 (1999); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-B:1 to 651-B:9 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11
(West 1995 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11 A-I to 29-11 A-8 (Michie 1978 &
Supp. 2000); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-v (Lexis Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-208.7 to 14-208.25 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2950.01 to 2950.14, 2950.99 (Anderson Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 581
to 587 1991 & West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.585 to 181.606 (1999); 42 PA. C.
S. A. §§ 9791-99.6 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to 11-37.1-19 (1994 & Lexis Supp.
[Vol. 81:127
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considerable discretion left to the states, the qualifying crimes under such laws
cover a broad spectrum, ranging from forcible rape to indecent exposure.23
States have also varied their information requirements, with many demanding
that offenders provide substantial personal data in addition to federally-
required information. 24 Similarly, penalties for failure to register vary from
1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-31 to 22-22-40 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101 (1997 & Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
62.01 to 62.12 (West Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 19.2-298.4 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.550 to
4.24.552 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); W.VA. CODE §§ 15-12-1 to 15-12-10 (Supp. 2000);
WIs. STAT. §§ 301.45 to 301.46 (1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-305, 7-19-
307 (Michie 1999).
23 Some states broaden the registration requirement far beyond the federal statute. Thus,
in Alabama and Arizona anyone convicted of the crime of indecent exposure must register.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-I 1-200 (requiring the registration of any adult convicted, inter alia, of
indecent exposure); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (requiring the registration of any
person convicted either of three or more violations of indecent exposure, or of two or more
such violations if the victim is less than fifteen years old). In California those convicted of
"lewd or dissolute conduct" are required to register. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 647(a)
(West 1999). Kansas includes in its definition of "sexually violent offense" the highly
interpretive "indecent liberties with a child." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(2) (West 1994
& Supp. 1999) (defining "sexually violent offense" to include "indecent liberties with a
child" under § 21-3503, which proscribes certain specific activities "with a child who is 14
or more years of age but less than 16 years of age"). Missouri law requires registration of
persons convicted of kidnapping or promoting prostitution. See Mo REV. STAT. §
589.400.1(2). Washington singles out a variety of felony offenses, such as murder, assault,
and kidnapping, if such crimes were sexually motivated. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
71.09.020(6) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (defining a number of crimes, including residential
burglary, as "sexually violent offense[s]" upon determination that they were sexually
motivated "beyond a reasonable doubt"). While almost all state laws include a forcible rape
conviction as grounds for registration, some statutes are specific to the rape of a child. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 12-12-909 (Michie 1999). For an in-depth review of
offenses meeting various state registration requirements, see Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The
Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and
Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
788, 799-802 (1996) (reviewing the range of offenses cited by statute in over two dozen
states).
24 Some states require. such things as social security numbers and places of employment.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-8306 (requiring a signed form summarizing all relevant
information, including social security number and residential address); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:542 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring the offender to notify "[a]t least one person in every
residence or business within a one-mile radius in a rural area and a three square block area
in an urban or suburban area" of the offender's address); Mo. REV. STAT. § 589.407(1)
(requiring a written statement by the offender concerning all aspects of the crime,
punishment, current residence, and employment, including social security and telephone
numbers); see also Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 802-14 (providing an overview of the
registration requirements in various states).
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misdemeanors to felony fines and/or sentences. Finally, notification
procedures differ dramatically from state to state. Many states have broad
notification procedures mandating public disclosure of all registered sex
offenders. 25 Others use a more restrictive, three-tiered, notification system.26
States using the latter system rely upon a risk assessment scale to categorize
offenders based on their risk of recidivism. 27 Under this system, the general
public receives notification regarding only those offenders who fall into the
highest risk category; narrower groups of persons are notified about sex
offenders with lesser risks of re-offense.2 8
While the registration laws apply to a variety of sex offenders, they resulted
largely from the public outcry surrounding several high-profile sex
crimes/murders committed against children by strangers or near-strangers. 29
25 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.730(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring that
certain information be "available for public inspection," and permitting that information to
be "available to the public through electronic [or] computerized ... means"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:542(B)(1)(a), (B)(3) (permitting the sentencing court to require a
notification via "signs, handbills, bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to that effect"); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 589.417(1)-(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (making available a complete list
of all registered offenders, including their names, addresses, and crimes, to anyone upon
request, but restricting all other registry information, including photographs, "to courts,
prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies"); see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in
the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1175 n.41 (1999) (reviewing states with
single-tier notification statutes).
26 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178E (West 1999) (promulgating rules for
registration and notification that reflect the relative risk of reoffense); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:7-8(c) (West 1997) (describing "three levels of notification depending upon the risk of
re-offense"); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-6 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (describing the criteria
for determining the type of notification based upon a low, moderate, or high risk of
recidivism); see also Logan, supra note 25, at 1175 n.40 (discussing three-tiered notification
statutes).
27 Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 461 (1998) [hereinafter Jonathan Simon, Monstrous]
(describing the "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" developed in New Jersey).
28 The New Jersey statute, for example, classifies notification obligations as follows:
(1) If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the person
registered shall be notified;
(2) If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community including schools,
religious and youth organizations shall be notified;
(3) If risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified through means.., designed
to reach members of the public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to
the notice required [elsewhere in the statute].
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(l)-(3).
29 In 1989, a seven-year-old Washington boy was found wandering in the woods after a
convicted sex offender lured him there, raped him and attempted to kill him. See Hal
Spencer, Victim's Mother Glad Predators Locked Up, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 1994, at B 1.
In 1990, Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old Minnesota boy, disappeared after he was
[Vol. 81:127
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The laws operate on the presumption that sex offenders, especially child sex
offenders, are incurable recidivists. The House Report accompanying the
federal law noted that the "[e]vidence suggests that child sex offenders are
generally serial offenders. Indeed, one recent study concluded [that] the
'behavior is highly repetitive, to the point of compulsion,' and found that 74%
of imprisoned child sex offenders had one or more prior convictions for a
sexual offense against a child. 30  State laws make similar findings.
31
Operating on this presumption of recidivism, registration and notification laws
aim "to give communities and law enforcement officials information that they
can use to prevent sex offenses in their neighborhoods, thereby reducing their
sense of helplessness." 32
B. Sexual Predator Laws
In the wake of high-profile, horrific sex crimes, 33 several states enacted laws
abducted from his home by an armed man. See 139 CONG. REc. H10,320-322 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993) (statements of Reps. Ramstad, Sensenbrenner, and Grams). In 1993, ten-
year-old Zachary Snider was raped and murdered by a local resident whom the young boy
thought was romantically involved with his mother. See Susan Schramm, Tape Played in
Molester's Slaying Trial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb, 7, 1995, at El. Finally, in 1994, Megan
Kanka's neighbor lured her "into his home with the promise of seeing his new puppy." He
used a belt to choke her, placed plastic bags over her head, raped her and left her body in the
park where it was later discovered. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 789.
30 H.R. REP. No. 392, at 4 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
3I The New Jersey Legislature justified its sex offender registration statute as follows:
The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other
predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by persons who prey on others
as a result of mental illness, require a system of registration that will permit law
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public
safety.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
While criticizing this justification, one commentator has noted that proponents of such
laws have effectively used it to gain support for them:
[I]t is simply not true that sex offenders have unusually high recidivism rates...
Despite studies indicating low recidivism rates, the public continues to perceive...
that the threat from sex offenders is greater than it actually is .... Advocates of sex
offender registration laws continue to fuel this public misconception by touting high
recidivism rates as the reason why registration laws are necessary.
Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
885, 897-98 (1995).
32 Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy
and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 92 (1996). State sex
offender laws are thus assuming an identity shaped largely by the public's desire for
punishment and retaliation. "The new penology is generally agnostic toward treatment. The
goal is waste management .... Sex offenders are our modern-day monsters .... See
Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 456.
33 For example, the Washington statute, the prototype for most others, was enacted after
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to provide for the civil commitment of sexual predators. Like registration and
notification laws, the intent of the sexual predator statutes is to protect the
public, in this case by preventing the reentry of certain sex offenders into
society. 34  Pursuant to these statutes, states may institute commitment
proceedings against any individual still within their custody 35 after conviction
of various sexual offenses, including rape, statutory rape, and sexual abuse of a
a convicted sex offender, recently released from prison, raped and sexually mutilated a
young boy. Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators - A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
594, 611 (1997) (reviewing the 1989 case that prompted the Washington legislature to enact
the Sexually Violent Predator Act).
34 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3707 (West Supp. 1999) (providing
for the commitment of sexually violent persons after their release from incarceration); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 to 6609.3 (West 1989 and Supp. 1999) (governing trial,
custody, diagnosis, treatment, and indefinite commitment of sexually violent predators);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to 16-13-216 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (providing
for an indeterminate term of commitment under the Colorado Sex Offender Act of 1968);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West Supp. 2000) (finding "that a civil commitment procedure
for the long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is necessary"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (West 1999) (enacting the statutes for the
"Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ I to 8
(West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (providing for the treatment of sexually dangerous persons);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 1998) (defining sexual psychopaths and sexually
dangerous persons who are subject to civil commitment); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to
632.513 (West 2000) (defining sexual predators and enumerating the associated crimes and
penalties); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to 29-2936 (1995) (enacting the "Convicted Sex
Offender Act" which defines the associated crimes and specifies the sentencing, treatment,
and possible commitment of convicted offenders); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 2C:47-10
(West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (providing for the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders);
id. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (requiring the registration of sexual offenders, including sexual
predators); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.510 to 426.680 (1999) (defining a sexually dangerous
person and the conditions for his commitment); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to 33-6-306
(1984 & Supp. 1999) (defining the conditions for commitment of a sexual offender); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to 77-16-5 (Supp. 1999) (providing for commitment after conviction
of a sex offender); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to 19.2-311 (Michie 2000) (providing for
the commitment of anyone convicted of a "criminal offense which indicates sexual
abnormality"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (defining a
sexually violent predator); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01 to 980.06 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999)
(defining sexually violent offenses and the requirements for commitment).
35 Missouri law goes even further, allowing the attorney general to institute proceedings
against an individual not in the custody of the state if that person has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense in the past and a law enforcement agency notifies the attorney
general that the individual has committed a "recent overt act" or "has been in the custody of
an agency with jurisdiction within the preceding ten years and may meet the criteria of a
sexually violent predator." Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.484.1(1)-(2) (West 1995 & Supp.
2000).
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child, 36 who otherwise meets the definition of "sexual predator." Typically,
the court or a state law enforcement official, such as the attorney general or a
prosecuting attorney, may institute commitment proceedings. 37 If there is
sufficient probable cause to detain the defendant as a sexual predator, he is
then evaluated by mental health professionals to determine whether he meets
that definition. Following the examination, the detained individual is entitled
to a trial, during which the judge or a jury must determine beyond a reasonable
doubt, whether he is a sexually violent predator. 38 The state may detain
36 In Missouri, for example, "sexually violent offense" includes forcible rape, rape, first
degree statutory rape, sodomy, first degree statutory sodomy, sexual abuse, sexual assault,
deviate sexual assault, and certain forms of sexual child abuse. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §
632.480(4) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (specifying the crimes qualifying as "sexually violent
offenses"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(6) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000)
(listing a variety of "sexually violent offenses").
37 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3716 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1999)
(providing for the commitment of sexually violent persons during and after incarceration);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)(1) (West 1999 & West Supp. 2000) (granting authority
to the Director of Corrections to refer prisoners for evaluation regarding commitment);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-205 (2000) (granting authority to initiate commitment
proceedings to the district attorney and to the court); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-566
(1998 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing the court and the state's attorney to initiate commitment
proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a04 (West 1999) (providing for the
commitment of sexually violent predators); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 12(b)
(West 2000) (authorizing the District Attorney and the Attorney General to initiate
commitment proceedings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185(l) (West 1999) (authorizing the
county attorney to initiate commitment proceedings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2925 (1999)
(authorizing the Department of Public Institutions to initiate commitment proceedings); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 426.510 to 426.680 (1999) (permitting the court to initiate commitment
proceedings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1 (Supp. 1999) (authorizing the court to initiate
commitment proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-300 (Michie 2000) (authorizing the trial
judge or the attorney for the Commonwealth to initiate commitment proceedings after
incarceration); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing
the prosecuting attorney to initiate commitment proceedings); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.02
(West 1999) (authorizing the initiation of commitment proceedings by the state department
of justice or by the district attorney). At least one state allows a psychiatrist, psychologist,
or other mental health professional to make the initial determination. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-6-305 (1997 & Supp. 1999) ("Not more than one (1) year nor less than six (6)
months prior to the non- parole release of any person convicted of a sex crime, an
examination of such person shall be made by a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist or
psychological examiner from the department of correction.").
18 Missouri and Washington have representative commitment schemes. See, e.g., Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 632.483, 632.486, 632.489, 632.492, 632.495 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.030, 71.09.050, 71.09.060(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000).
For more in-depth discussion of commitment procedures, see Morris, supra note 33, at 611-
15 (reviewing the actions taken to close "gaps" in the pre-existing system after determining
that "the potential for curing sexually violent offenders was unlikely," including the hearing
process and the statutory procedures for commitment of sexually violent predators).
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indefinitely any offender found to fall within this designation. 39
Unlike registration and notification statutes, these new commitment statutes
do not apply to all sex offenders. Instead, they pertain only to a "small but
extremely dangerous group of predators" 40 who suffer from a "mental
abnormality" or a "personality disorder"4' that makes them likely to engage in
future "predatory acts of sexual violence. '42 According to legislators, such
abnormality, while not rising to the level of mental illness for the purposes of
existing civil commitment statutes, renders such individuals likely to engage in
repeated acts of sexual violence. 43 Because ordinary commitment procedures
are insufficient to protect society in this instance, sexual predator statutes
prescribe altered procedures for those falling within their reach.44
31 "If the court or jury so determines, that the person is a sexually violent predator, the
person shall be committed . . . until such time as the person's mental abnormality has so
changed that the person is safe to be at large." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2000). For statutes using identical or similar language, see FLA. STAT. ch. 394.917(2)
(2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)(West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A)
(Law Co-op. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000).
40 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (finding
"that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist[s]" who
require long-term commitment).
4' The term "mental abnormality" is generally defined as "a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). For
similar definitions, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000)
and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1999).
42 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (defining a
sexually violent predator as a "person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence if not confined"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(l) (West 1988 &
Supp. 2000) (defining a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been convicted of
or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility"). Predatory acts of sexual violence are often
defined as "acts directed towards strangers or individuals with whom relationships have
been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." Mo. ANN. STAT. §
632.480(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(4)
(West 1988 & Supp. 2000). Kansas originally used a similar definition of sexual predator
but recently amended its statutes so that commitment can occur if the detained individual
has a "mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in repeat acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1999).
41 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (finding that
certain "sex offenders' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is
high"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1999) (finding "that there exists an extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality
disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence").
I The new sexual predator laws are closely related to earlier sexual psychopath laws that
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C. Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
In 1995, Congress enacted several evidentiary provisions allowing the
admission of propensity evidence against sexual offenders. Specifically, FRE
413 and 414 allow the prosecution to put forth evidence of a defendant's past
sexual offenses in a criminal trial for sexual assault or child molestation. 45
FRE 415 allows the use of such evidence in civil cases that are based upon
sexual assault, sexual harassment, or child molestation. 46 The rules make clear
that the evidence admitted under these rules "may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant. '47
were popular in the mid-twentieth century. Between 1937 and 1960, at least half of the
states enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitment of sexual psychopaths. See
Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sexual Psychopath" Statute:
From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889,
897-903 (1995) (discussing the "sexual psychopath" statutes enacted by twenty-six states
and the District of Columbia during this period). Such laws viewed sexual psychopaths as
mentally ill and permitted commitment as an alternative to criminal punishment. See
Stephen R. McAllister, "Punishing" Sex Offenders, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 27, 45 (1997) ("The
original sexual psychopath statutes operated on the premise that a sex offender was either
'bad' or 'mad,' but not both."). Due to reforms in the 1970s, many states repealed such
laws and replaced them with laws imposing criminal punishment on sex offenders. See
Joelle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It that in the Process He
Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver Bullets - Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415 - and a Stake Through the Heart - Kansas v. Hendricks, 49 FLA.
L. REV. 505, 530-31 (1997) ("By 1990, half the states had repealed their sexual psychopath
statutes and, of the remaining states, only five have actively enforced their laws."). The
1990s saw a resurgence of such statutes, although their purpose now is to use civil
commitment as a way of prolonging detention rather than an alternative to criminal
punishment. See McAllister, supra, at 45 (discussing the newer sexual predator acts that
provide for involuntary commitment after completion of the term of criminal confinement).
45 FED. R. EVID. 413(a) and 414(a). The new rules became law in 1995 and technically
created an offense-specific exception to the bar on admissibility of character evidence for
sexual assault. For an in-depth discussion of enactment and effect of FRE 413, see Baker,
supra note 10, at 563-624 (reviewing the legislative history, intent, and potential effects of
FRE 413).
46 FED. R. EVID. 415(a) ("In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual
assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as
provided in FRE 413 and FRE 414 of these rules.").
47 FED. R. EvID. 413(a), 414(a). FRE 415 notes that such evidence in civil cases "may be
considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules." FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
There was early controversy regarding whether FRE 413-415 were exempt from FRE
403, which allows a court to exclude evidence determined to be more prejudicial than
probative. Courts have since ruled that FRE 413-415 are subject to FRE 403 balancing test.
See, e.g., United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Under both [FRE
413 and 414] the court must conduct a Rule 403 balancing test prior to admitting the
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The new rules are an exception to the general prohibition against the use of
past "bad acts" as character or propensity evidence at trial. Traditionally, our
law operates on the presumption that "a defendant must be tried for what he
did, not for who he is."'48 Thus, FRE 404 provides that "[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show actions in conformity therewith." 49  The purpose behind
exclusion of such evidence lies in its prejudicial tendencies:
[Character evidence] is objectionable not because it has no appreciable
probative value but because it has too much. The natural and inevitable
tendency of the tribunal.., is to give excessive weight to the vicious
record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly
on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a
condemnation, irrespective of the accused's guilt of the present charge.50
Prior to enactment of FRE 413-415, evidence of prior sexual offenses was
allowed under FRE 404 for non-character purposes, such as to show
defendant's motive or to impeach him.5' The new rules, however, go far
beyond any of FRE 404's exceptions and allow prosecutors and civil plaintiffs
to introduce evidence of a defendant's past acts in order to demonstrate the
likelihood that he committed a similar act in the present situation.
Proponents argued that the new rules were "critical to the protection of the
public from rapists and child molesters" whose crimes are distinctive in
nature. 52 Relying on the assumption that sex offenders were predisposed to
repeat their crimes, they contended that "[i]n sex-related crimes, it can be
particularly useful to demonstrate a propensity of the accused to commit
similar prior offenses. '53 Furthermore, proponents of the rules argued that
evidence."); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing the
House and Senate legislative histories of FRE 413 as support for applying the FRE 403
balancing test to evidence that is otherwise admissible under FRE 413); United States v.
Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying FRE 403 balancing test to evidence
submitted under FRE 414); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding "Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence offered under Rule 414 to be
consistent with Congress's intent." Id.); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 624
(D.N.J. 1996) ("[T]his Court determines that evidence proffered under [FRE 415] must still
be shown to be relevant, probative and 'legally relevant' under FRE 403."); see also cases
cited in Erik D. Ojala, Note, Propensity Evidence Under Rule 413: The Need for Balance,
77 WASH. U.L.Q. 947, 968-69 nn.105, 113 (1999).
48 United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
49 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
50 1A HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (1983).
51 FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (exceptions to ban on evidence of prior acts includes evidence to
prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident).
52 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
53 140 CONG. REC. H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl); see also 140
CONG. REC. S12, 263 (daily ed. Aug 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Why should we
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these changes were necessary to battle credibility problems faced by many rape
victims at trial.54 In addition, sponsors of the rules suggested that they might
encourage rape victims, who are often reluctant, to come forward and tell their
stories. 55 Finally, they countered arguments regarding potential prejudice to
the defendant by pointing to studies showing that the likelihood of false rape
allegations is minimal. 56
The passage of FRE 413, 414, and 415 was not without contention. Many
groups opposed the proposal, with some likening the rules to the "star
chamber" proceedings of medieval England, 57 others arguing that such
evidence would unfairly prejudice the defendant, 58 and still others arguing that
the rules unreasonably diminished existing constitutional protections for
criminal defendants. 59 Despite their controversy, the rules became law in 1995
not let the juries know.., that these people have a pattern and series of acts that they have
done that have amounted to rape."); 140 CONG. REC. S10, 276 (daily ed. Aug 2, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole) ("[W]hen someone is out there committing sex crime after sex
crime... this [propensity] evidence should be admitted."); 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily
ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) ("The past conduct of a person with a
history of rape or child molestation provides evidence that he or she has the combination of
aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes and lacks the
inhibitions against acting on these impulses. A charge of rape or child molestation has a
greater plausibility against such a person."); 140 CONG. REC. H2434 (daily ed. Apr. 19,
1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (commenting "given what we know about the recidivist
nature of sex offenders you might think that the criminal justice system does all that it can to
keep them in prison").
54 See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(discussing concern about false accusation and consent defenses at sexual assault trials); see
also 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) ("If the
defendant has committed similar acts in the past, the claims of the victim are more likely to
be considered truthful if there is substantiation of other assaults.").
55 See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl)
("Victims who [might be reluctant to pursue charges] are often willing to bear the burden of
testifying when they know that the person who marred their lives has also victimized others
and that these revelations will come out at trial.").
56 See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
" See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) ("If the primary evidence in a prosecution's case in chief is evidence of prior
acts-which would be possible under the changes-we would be sinking into the star
chamber procedures that have long been rejected by civilized societies everywhere.").
58 See 139 CONG. REC. S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(noting that evidence of past acts "tends to ... blind people to looking at the real facts
before them and making an independent judgment").
59 The Judicial Conference Committee argued that the rules would "diminish
significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases...
against undue prejudice." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN
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with the weight of the executive department 6° and the populace behind them.
While representing a change at the federal level, the rules are not entirely
without precedent. A few state courts have allowed admission of past sexual
misconduct under a "lustful disposition" or "depraved sexual instinct"
CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 52-53 (1995).
Certain public interest groups, such as the National Organization for Women and the
American Civil Liberties Union echoed these sentiments, as did many legal scholars. See
140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (expressing
shared concern regarding due process, evidence, and the American system of freedom); see
also Michael S. Ellis, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415, 38
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 978 (1998) ("[J]udges consistently found the probative value of
[character] evidence to be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."); James Joseph
Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A
Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 107-08 (1994) (asserting that
propensity evidence carries an inherent risk of convicting the innocent and may violate due
process and the presumption of innocence); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task
of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the
Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 296 (1995) (noting that in
offenses such as sexual misconduct character evidence "carr[ies] great potential for unfair
prejudice and ha[s] little probative value"); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Sigall, "Are
You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due
Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12 (1996) ("[A]dmission of propensity evidence
prevents a fair trial and thus violates the due process clauses of the Constitution."); Mark A.
Sheft, Federal Rules of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
57, 71 (1995) ("Rule 413 continues the disturbing dilution of the legal protection that
historically prevented the admission of prejudicial or otherwise disfavored evidence.");
Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child
Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415?,
14 J.L. & POL. 153, 193-94 (1998).
60 While FRE 413-415 were enacted during the Clinton Administration, which did not
oppose the rules, the considerable push for their passage occurred during the Bush
Administration. Prior to their enactment, David Karp, a senior counsel in the Bush Justice
Department publicly spoke about the need for FRE 413-415. See David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
15, 19-26 (1994) (supporting the admission of evidence to aid the jury in foreclosing
reasonable doubt in inconclusive cases and resolving claims between plaintiff and
defendant). The House and Senate sponsors of the rules explicitly relied upon Karp's
reasoning in justifying them. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari) (quoting Karp's speech regarding the benefits of admitting
evidence "on any matter to which it is relevant" rather than the stricter rules of 404(b)); see
also Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to
Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24,
1991) ("These new rules are responsive to deficiencies in the existing rules of evidence ....
[It is an] entirely sound perception that evidence of this type is frequently of critical
importance in establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and that concealing it from
the jury often carries a grave risk that such criminal will be turned loose to claim other
victims.").
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exception.6' As with the federal rules, courts using the "lustful disposition"
exception rely upon the notion that sex offenses are uncommon, that sex
offenders are highly recidivistic, and that the lack of substantive evidence in
sexual assault crimes creates a need for additional evidence.62
D. The Violence Against Women Act
In 1994, after extensive hearings and debate, Congress passed its first
comprehensive legislative attempt to deal with violence against women. The
Violence Against Women Act addresses this problem in several ways. It
provides, for example, a substantial number of grants aimed at battling
violence against women63 and establishes or provides assistance for
61 See, e.g., State v. Lachtermann, 812 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("Evidence
of repeated acts of sexual abuse of children demonstrates, per se, a propensity for sexual
aberration and a depraved sexual instinct and should be recognized as an additional, distinct
exception to the rule against the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes."); State v.
Raye, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (older sister allowed to offer corroborating
evidence of incest "for the purpose of showing intent as well as the unnatural lust of the
defendant"); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531 (R.I. 1992) (evidence of prior acts
previously allowed to demonstrate motive, design, plan, and scheme now admissible to
demonstrate defendant's "lewd disposition"); see also Maynard v. State, 513 N.E.2d 641,
647 (Ind. 1987) (testimony concerning prior sexual acts was admissible to "show a
continuing plan on [defendant's] part to exploit and sexually abuse [plaintiff]"), overruled
by Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992) (prior sexual misconduct admitted
only to demonstrate proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake and not to demonstrate "bad character"); State v. Edward
Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 131 (W.Va. 1990) (evidence admissible so long as prior acts
were used to establish defendant's identity, absence of mistake or accident, and intent);
State v. Tarrell, 247 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Wis. 1976) (determining that a consideration of all
sexual incidents might establish a general plan and therefore a motive or intent to commit
the alleged act).
62 See Taylor, 735 S.W.2d at 415 ("[T]he commission of a sex crime has an inherent
significance as evidence the perpetrator has previously committed ... [similar acts]."); see
also Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1335-37 (noting that high rates of recidivism in child
molestation cases and difficulties of proof form the basis for this exception). For an
excellent description of the lustful disposition exception, see Baker, supra note 10, at 582
("Not all courts accept [the lustful disposition] exception, but those that do rest the
exception on the previously discussed misconceptions that rapists are rare and particularly
recidivistic, and on a belief that the private nature of the act justifies letting in prior act
evidence due to the absence of corroborating witnesses."). See also David P. Bryden &
Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 559
(1994) (asserting that these exceptions "do[] not justify the admission of uncharged
misconduct to show a 'depraved sexual instinct"').
63 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 13931 (West 1995) (grants for capital improvements to
prevent crime in public transportation); id. § 13971 (grants to government entities to assist
in rural domestic violence and child abuse enforcement assistance).
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information-gathering and training programs. 64 By far its most significant
provision, however, was its now defunct civil rights remedy, 65 which provided
a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. 66
The civil rights remedy had two distinct requirements. First, it required a
woman bringing a claim to show that she was the victim of a violent felony
under state or federal law.67 Second, a VAWA plaintiff was required to show
that the crime of violence was "motivated by gender," that is, that it was
committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender; and due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 68
VAWA arose out of the belief that "[o]ur country has an unfortunate blind
spot when it comes to certain crimes against women. Historically, [such]
crimes ... have been perceived as anything but crime-as a 'family' problem,
as a 'private' matter, as sexual 'miscommunication.' ' 69 Recognizing the
6 See id. § 13941 (training programs for parole officers and other personnel working
with sex offenders); id. § 13961 (encouraging National Research Council to develop
research agenda regarding increased understanding of violence against women); id. § 13963
(requiring Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the nationwide incidence and
cost of injuries resulting from domestic violence).
65 The Supreme Court recently struck down VAWA as beyond Congress' regulatory
powers. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2000) (neither the
Commerce Clause nor the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
Congress with the authority to enact a civil remedy). Despite the Supreme Court's action,
examination of that provision and its relationship to the crazed rapist myth is nevertheless
useful. First, it provides an example of how otherwise laudable legislation may still
reinforce stereotypes. Second, the civil rights action presents issues similar to bias-crime
statutes including gender that are increasingly popular in many states. See Julie Goldscheid,
Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights
Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 139 (1999) (noting that by 1998, 40 states and
the District of Columbia carried a bias crime law on their books with 19 of those states
specifically addressing gender-based bias crimes).
66 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(c) (West 1995) (victim of a crime of violence motivated by
gender may recover damages and any other relief the court deems appropriate). Although
the statute is gender-neutral, this Article refers to victims of gender-bias as "she," reflecting
that Congress was primarily concerned with violence against women.
67 See id. § 13981(c) (providing a cause of action against any person "who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free
from crimes of violence]"). The civil rights remedy provides that a "crime of violence" is
"an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would
constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury
to another" and comes within the meaning of state and federal offenses described in section
16 of Title 18. Id. § 13981 (d)(2)(A). Section 16 of Title 18 states that a "crime of violence"
includes "an offense that is a felony and that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force... may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C.A. §
16(b) (West 1995).
68 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (d)(1) (West 1995).
69 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 37 (1991).
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barriers historically blocking rape victims' redress, VAWA's supporters
intended the Act to educate the public and members of the legal system
regarding "archaic prejudices that blame women" for sexual assault, give
women assurance that their attackers would be prosecuted and ensure that trials
would "concentrate on the conduct of the attacker rather than the conduct of
the victim. '70 With respect to the civil rights action, in particular, Congress
acknowledged through VAWA that traditional civil rights remedies against
discrimination had been largely unavailable to women suffering from gender-
biased attacks.7 1 By "[p]lacing this violence in the context of the civil rights
laws," Congress sought to embrace the feminist position that "recognizes
[sexual violence] for what it is-a hate crime. '72
II. DECONSTRUCTING RAPE
Do the above-referenced laws comport with feminist ideals regarding rape
prosecution and punishment? To answer that question we must first examine
the traditional legal paradigm and accompanying myths regarding rape as well
as feminist efforts to debunk such myths and to expand our understanding of
the crime of rape.
A. A Brief History of Rape Prosecution and Feminist Reform Efforts
The Anglo-American tradition has historically treated rape-generally
defined as the "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly or against her will" 73-
as a serious crime.74 In the eighteenth century, Blackstone noted that rape of a
70 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
71 See id. at 48 (past legislature has not filled the "gender gap" left by traditional anti-bias
crime law). Congress noted that:
Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or gender bias, the results
are often the same. The victims of such violence are reduced to symbols of hatred;
they are chosen not because of who they are as individuals but because of their class
status. The violence not only wounds physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling
fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly situated.
Id. at 49.
72 Id. at 49.
73 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209 (1803). Although states have built
upon and altered current definitions of rape, it is still conceived to be remarkably similar to
Blackstone's definition - forcible and non-consensual sex. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §
566.030 (West 1999) ("A person commits the crime of forcible rape if such person has
sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion."); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 39 (1992) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy] (noting that most laws "[i]n one form or another...
preserve[] as essential requirements both force and non-consent").
71 In fact, the punishment of rape goes back to ancient and Roman law. See, e.g., Donald
Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the
Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781-82 (1992) (noting that the rape of a
virgin was a serious crime that ancient code, roman law, and early English law punished
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woman was historically punishable by death.75 Until relatively recently, death
was a potential punishment for rape in several states. 76 While the death
penalty is no longer available as punishment,77 most state laws currently
impose substantial penalties for rape, 78 and most citizens consider it second
only to homicide in terms of its heinousness. 79
Although rape is considered a serious and despicable crime in the abstract,
feminist scholarship over the last three decades exposed that an underlying
misogyny and a desire to protect male domination over women have
traditionally impaired the enforcement of rape laws. Few rape cases, feminist
scholars noted, actually resulted in successful convictions of accused rapists. 80
According to these scholars, at least part of this failure, was attributable to
severely).
71 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *210 (noting that rapists were punished by death
under early Saxon, old Gothic and Scandinavian law).
76 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (noting that as of 1971, 16 states
and the federal government authorized capital punishment for forcible rape).
77 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (striking down Georgia law authorizing death penalty for
rape of an adult woman as "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment and...
therefore forbidden by the 8th Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment"). Relying on
a narrow reading of Coker, Louisiana recently enacted a law authorizing the death penalty
for rape of a child under 12 years of age. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14.42(A)(4), (D)(2)
(West Supp. 1999). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1063 (La. 1996) (upholding death sentence for
a man convicted of raping three girls under ten on grounds that the punishment is not out of
proportion with the severity of the crime). Other states are also considering such legislation.
See Meryl P. Diamond, Assessing the Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 73
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1159, 1160 n.6 (1999) (discussing pending legislation in Georgia and
Pennsylvania).
78 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (potential sentence of
life imprisonment for forcible rape); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987))
("Convictions for rape often have brought the most severe sentences the law can impose.").
79 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: THE SEVERITY
OF CRIME 2 (1984) (survey of 60,000 people revealed that the they put rape and child abuse
second only to murder in terms of their seriousness); see also GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 62 (1989) ("[P]eople
regard rape as a heinous offense worthy of the most serious punishment.").
80 See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993) ("[S]uccessful prosecution of cases not meeting the stereotype
of real rape, while no longer impossible, remains improbable."); Scheppele, supra note 78,
at 1098 ("One study ... indicated that men who raped had about a 13% chance of being
convicted, assuming the victim reported the crime to the police. Another study revealed the
chances were closer to 2%."); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws, Sexism in Society and Law,
61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 927 (1973) (commenting on the relatively few apprehended rapists
charged and convicted, and noting that in California there is a higher acquittal rate for rape
than for any other felony).
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formal legal rules posing substantial barriers to prosecution. Such rules
included the requirement that a woman physically oppose a man to the
"utmost" before violent and forcible sexual intercourse could be construed as
rape. 81  The rules also imposed onerous and unusual 82 evidentiary
requirements, designed to cast doubt on the victim's truthfulness. 83 They
further demanded cautionary jury instructions explicitly advising jurors to be
skeptical of victims' claims. 84 Scholars also pointed to cultural barriers to rape
81 See generally Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1105-25 (discussing that this requirement
defines rape in terms of a woman's resistance rather than male force used to overcome
female nonconsent). "Utmost resistance" amounts to physical struggle, short of putting
oneself at significant risk of death, necessary to prevent the rape from occurring-i.e., the
kind of struggle that leaves visible marks as proof of the victim's defense of virtue. See,
e.g., Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906) ("Not only must there be entire
absence of mental consent or assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of every
physical means of faculty within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her person,
and this must be shown to persist until the offense is consummated."). Courts viewed the
victim's failure to resist as evidence of her consent to sex. See Estrich, Rape, supra note 7,
at 1105-25 (noting that failure to resist may result in a determination that the woman victim,
rather than the man, was the party acting unreasonably).
82 See Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Rape prosecutions have also included evidentiary
requirements not imposed in other criminal trials."); see also Dubois, supra note 7, at 1098
("In New York, a woman's charge of rape was subject to the strictest corroboration
requirements in the country... [a] woman's complaint of rape standing alone was
'incredible as a matter of law."').
83 Many courts, for example, adhered to the "prompt complaint" and "corroboration"
requirements. See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1088 ("The prompt complaint doctrine is a
specific exception to the rule against prior consistent statements founded upon a distrust of
rape complainants and a fear of false accusations."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1139
(the MPC adopted the "prompt complaint" requirement and required some corroborating
proof due to fear of blackmail); Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Until recently, the state
could only prove rape where some piece of independent evidence corroborated the victim's
story."). The prompt complaint requirement stems as far back as Blackstone who noted that
"in order to prevent malicious accusations, [Anglo law] ... required that the woman should
immediately after... go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible
persons of the she injury she has suffered." BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *211. In rape
trials, evidence of failure to complain promptly was presented to the jury and created a
strong presumption against the victim's credibility. See, e.g., Baccio v. People, 41 N.Y.
265, 268 (1869) (noting that it is natural for a woman to immediately complain of crime to a
close friend/relative and failure to do so "would be strong evidence that her affirmation on
the subject ... was false"). The corroboration requirement similarly stemmed from the
notion that women lie about sex, as reflected in Lord Hale's statement that rape "is an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused, tho[ugh] never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 634 (1778); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980) ("In
no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that under other circumstances may
be welcomed by the 'victim."').
84 See Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1046 (commenting on MPC advice that "the
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convictions. At all stages of prosecution, they argued, police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries relied on rape myths to discount the possibility that a rape
had occurred. 85 Such myths included notions that "women, motivated by
revenge, blackmail, jealousy, guilt, or embarrassment falsely claim rape after
consenting to sex,"86 that women fantasize about being raped,87 that only "bad"
women are raped,88 and that women provoke rape through their appearance
jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with
special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private"). A
typical instruction based upon Lord Hale's concerns, see supra note 83, the mandate that
"[t]he law requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named in the
information with caution." Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1045.
85 See ZSUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 17 (1987) (maintaining that it has become
"increasingly clear that rape victims were systematically subjected to institutionalized
sexism, which began with their treatment by police, continued through the legal system...
and ended with the acquittal of many de facto rapists"); Shirley Feldman-Summers & Karen
Lindner, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal Assault Cases, 3 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 135, 135-36 (1976) (noting that a "major factor" in the failure of rape prosecutions
"is related to the judgmental policies of the police, the prosecuting attorneys, and the
juries"); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1047 (discussing the reflection of rape myths
in juror and judicial misconceptions about rape).
86 Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1025; see Mary I. Combs, Telling the Victim's
Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 282 (1993) ("The assumption inherent in some myths is
that the woman is consciously lying to hide her sexual complicity or to harm the man.").
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, for example, argued that the prompt complaint
doctrine was necessary to protect against the possibility that "unwanted pregnancy or
bitterness at a relationship gone sour might convert a willing participant in sexual relations
to a vindictive complainant." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 421 (1980). Others
similarly used women's vindictiveness to support the corroboration requirement. See
MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 187-90 (1951) (false rape charges might be brought
for blackmail, pure fantasy, revenge, spitefulness, or psychopathic reasons); Note,
Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967) (women accuse
men falsely because of mental illness, delusions, shame, bitterness, pregnancy, hatred, or
preference for a false explanation to a true one).
87 See Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:
THE HIDDEN CRIME 31 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) [hereinafter
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE] (commenting the continuing belief that some women like to be
"treated violently and that force is sexually stimulating to women"); Torrey, Rape Myths,
supra note 7, at 1026 (despite the past prevalence of the theory that women fantasized about
rape, the theory has been widely discredited). In Rusk v. State, for example, several justices
of the Maryland Supreme Court argued that the victim, who verbally resisted but did not
physically resist, was not a rape victim because her verbal requests to desist did "not
transform a seducer into a rapist." Rusk v. State, 424 A.2d 730, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J.,
dissenting).
88 See Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1025 ("A study of rape done in the District of
Columbia found that in 82% of the rapes studied, the rape victims had a 'good
reputation."'). The prompt complaint doctrine reflects this myth in operation. Courts
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and behavior. 89
Scholars argued that legal rules and cultural myths focusing on female
veracity and malice diverted attention from the defendant's behavior,
effectively putting the rape victim on trial.90 More particularly, they noted,
victim-blaming rules and myths prevented successful prosecution of
"acquaintance" rape.9' Because acquaintance rape often centered on the issue
reasoned that a "good" girl reports the damage to her person promptly because she has
nothing to hide. In contrast, failure to report promptly reflects either a victim's nefarious
motive or her "badness." See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1094 ("Evidence of a prompt
complaint is necessary because the courts decided that rape is an attack that no 'honest'
woman could keep to herself.").
89 See JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND
PUBLIC ATTITUDES 118 (1981) (recounting study results in which "most respondents... saw
women's behavior and/or appearance as the second most frequent cause of rape"). The
behavior sufficient to doom a woman's rape claim is quite varied, see STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 28 (1998) (jury acquitted on grounds of questionable
occupations, past consensual sex, and unconventional family values), including such things
as her manner of dress, see Jury: Woman in Rape Case "Asked for It," CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6,
1989 (jury acquitted a rape suspect on grounds that the woman wore a lace mini-skirt
without underwear), her past employment, see Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American
Crime, RAMPARTS 56 (1971) (upon cross-examination woman "admitted" to working as a
cocktail waitress on occasion), her appearance unescorted in a bar, especially if she
voluntarily consumed alcohol, see Karen Kramer, Note, Rule By Myth: The Social and
Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115,
121 (1994) (women who drink are perceived as more sexually available by both men and
women), and her past sexual activity, whether during the encounter at issue or a different
one. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (defense attorneys were permitted to "delve into issues like
the victim's use of birth control, her attendance (unescorted) at bars, the existence of any
illegitimate children, and the number of her prior sexual experiences").
I See Laurie Bechhofer and Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87, at 9-12 (the fact that an acquaintance rape victim
knows her assailant seems to make her appear partially to blame for the incident); Susan
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829-32 (1991) [hereinafter Estrich, Sex at
Work] (contending that the court holds women responsible for their "own torment" by
basing the determination of harassment of women on their behavior); Torrey, Rape Myths,
supra note 7, at 1058 ("The female victim must prove her innocence, while the male
defendant is treated as if he has been defamed."); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 29-30 (1975) (tracing the modern concept of rape as a
personal injury and corresponding suspicions of female motivations dating back to the 13th
Century).
9" See Lynne Henderson, Rape & Responsibility, I 1 L. & PHIL. 127, 128 (1992) (noting
that the meaning of "nonconsensual" and "forcible" are bitterly contested in all but the most
stereotypical case of rape); see also Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship
Make a Difference?: A Look at the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 821-22 (1996) (in
cases lacking physical evidence of rape the focus often turns to the woman's state of mind to
the exclusion of the man's).
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of consent, "the victim's character [was] inevitably a critical issue. '92
Accordingly, the operation of rape myths regarding the victim presented a
particularly difficult obstacle to overcome. Ultimately, the duality of rape
prosecutions-the willingness to convict men who raped strangers but not
those who raped acquaintances-led scholars to conclude that rape law
reflected a profound misogyny. According to Lynne Henderson:
[A] primary impediment to recognition that rape is a real and frequent
crime [is the] unspoken "rule" of male innocence and female guilt in
law[] ... [the] unexamined belief that men are not morally responsible
for their heterosexual conduct, while females are morally responsible
both for their conduct and for the conduct of males. Indeed, men are
entitled to act on their sexual passions, which are viewed as difficult and
sometimes impossible to control; this belief also says that women should
know this and avoid stimulating them if they do not wish to have sexual
intercourse . . . .The male innocence/female guilt story is inapplicable
only in the case of heterosexual relations and rape involving black men
and white women, where the story is reversed: the theme in this context
becomes male guilt and female innocence both in law and in culture. But
otherwise, the defining story for interpreting rape in law and fact is that of
male innocence/female guilt.93
In an effort to broaden legal recognition of rape and to overcome victim
blaming myths and practices, 94 many feminists lobbied for, and were largely
successful in effecting, legal reforms. Pursuant to their efforts, many states
92 See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1204 (1997).
93 Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack
of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female
victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose
victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by
the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the
defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems
to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped
any given woman.").
This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape
victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER
CALLED IT RAPE: THE Ms. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are
perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural
perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and
subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn. 187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim
reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims).
I See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law
reforms).
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abolished or substantially softened the corroboration requirement, 95 cautionary
jury instructions, 96 marital rape exemptions, 97 and the "utmost" resistance
requirement.98 In response to feminist efforts, states also adopted rape shield
laws designed to protect victims from brutal cross-examinations about their
past sexual history. 99 Many states also redefined rape as "sexual assault,"'0 0
reflecting the feminist belief that "rape is a crime of violence [rather than]
uncontrollable sexual passion."10'
Whether these legal reforms effected feminist goals, however, is
questionable. While society is now more familiar with acquaintance rape, 102
most research shows only marginal improvement in the legal system's
response to rape. 10 3 Women still do not report rape and the proportion of rape
9' See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 37; Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at
1137 n.155; Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99.
96 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198.
97 The common law definition of rape specifically excluded the possibility that a wife
could claim rape by her husband. See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape
Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352-53 (1995). Many states
have repealed the exemption entirely although several retain a partial exemption in some
circumstances. See id.
9' See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38; Estrich, Rape, supra note
7, at 1123-24 (noting the elimination of the "utmost resistance" requirement). To some
extent, the elimination of the utmost resistance requirement began before the feminist
movement. During the 1950s, the drafters of the Model Penal Code advocated abolition of
the standard. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38.
99 See KATHERINE T. BARTLETr & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER & LAW 832 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing rape shield laws enacted in response to feminist critique). Every state currently
has a statutory or common law rape shield doctrine. See id. (noting that by 1997 only Utah
and Arizona, states which had common law rape shield doctrines, had not passed rape shield
laws). The Federal Rules of Evidence also contain a rape shield provision. See FED. R.
EvID. 412.
10 See Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform
Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 25, 25-26 (1987)
(noting the feminist redefinition of rape as "sexual assault").
101 Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198; see also Morrison Torrey, Feminist
Legal Scholarship On Rape: A Maturing Look At One Form of Violence Against Women, 2
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38-39 (1995) [hereinafter Torrey, Feminist Scholarship]
(discussing the liberal feminists' characterization of rape as "violence" as opposed to "sex").
102 See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 (citing to noted New York City
prosecutor Linda Fairstein's assessment that juries currently are more sympathetic to the
notion of acquaintance rape than in the past).
'03 See generally CASIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 157-75 (1992) (containing a survey of rape law reform
demonstrating the limited improvement of the legal system's response to rape); Ronald J.
Berger, et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 329, at 334-
36 (1988) (pointing out the limitations of rape reform laws); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note
92, at 1283-94 (asserting that rape law reforms have had a low impact on conviction rates
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prosecutions and convictions to reported rapes has not dramatically
increased.1°4 Nor have legal reforms necessarily shifted the focus of the trial
away from the victim. The issues of force and non-consent remain part of the
law105 and "criminal justice officials still believe that resistance by the victim
and corroboration of her testimony are important determinants of whether a
rape case will result in conviction." 10 6 Additionally, rape shield laws often
provide only minimal protection to victims, who are still subjected to
questioning regarding their sexual practices, especially in acquaintance rape
situations.10 7
The failure of legal reforms can be partly attributed to feminists themselves.
Much reform came about as a result of the "liberal" feminist movement whose
primary focus was to gain recognition of female autonomy and individual
choice. 108  Accordingly, liberal feminists did not substantially question
traditional rape law's focus on female non-consent as the dividing line between
sex and rape. Rather, they concentrated their efforts on eradicating or
mitigating legal tactics that undermine the victim's credibility regarding the
issue of consent. 09 Given that so much of the misogyny underlying rape law
manifested itself in victim-blaming rules and myths, the liberal feminist focus
was understandable. Nevertheless, by failing to question the traditional, non-
consent model of rape law, liberal feminist efforts eventually failed:
[Feminist] attempts to change the standards, set by legislation and
common law to reflect the "objective" conditions of sexual assault...
[were] fundamentally inconsistent with the social reality of rape: Women
who are sexually attacked are concerned with their survival, not with the
demonstration of nonconsent . . . .The need to legitimate women's
claims, in terms of [traditional] legal discourse, force[d] the comparison
between all acts of sexual violence and the hypothetical "real rape" (i.e., a
and rates of reported rape); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing,
31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1985) (asserting that rape reform laws have had a limited
effect).
104 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 103, at 160 (noting that rape reforms "did not
produce an increase in the likelihood of conviction, and they produced an increase in reports
and the likelihood of indictment in only one of the six [studied] jurisdictions").
105 Anne M. Coughlin, Sex & Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998); see also Schulhofer,
Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73 (discussing continuing problems with the traditional view
of consent as well as efforts to expand the conception of force).
106 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 103, at 159.
107 Id. at 164-71 (criticizing rape shield laws as failing to exclude evidence of the
victim's sexual history, particularly the history of sexual relations between the victim and
the defendant).
108 See Torrey, Feminist Scholarship, supra note 101, at 38 (noting that liberal
feminism's emphasis on issues of "privacy, autonomy, and individual choice shaped
emerging rape reform").
109 See Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and
Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 76 (1987).
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woman resisting a stranger with a lethal weapon on the street). The
liberalization of the law depend[ed] on establishing the validity of
women's claims that [were] least likely to fit into the law's "ideal
type."1 10
In order to avoid unfavorable comparisons between the "real" rape paradigm
and the actual incidence of rape, "dominance" feminists took a different tack.
To combat rape effectively, they argued, feminists cannot simply shoehorn
reforms into the traditional rape paradigm or define rape solely in terms of
violence.' Rather, they must gain a richer understanding of the crime, its
complex interaction between sex and violence, and its roots in the societal,
political, and economic power that men maintain over women. 1 2 Thus,
dominance feminists have expanded their efforts beyond counteracting the
"female guilt" aspect of the male innocence/female guilt narrative to include a
closer examination of the "male innocence" portion of that story.1 3 The next
section discusses the myth of the crazed rapist, an aspect of the "male
innocence" story critical to understanding the traditional rape paradigm.
B. The Myth of the Crazed Rapist
In the male innocence/female guilt equation, the relationship between the
two parts is relatively straightforward-blaming the victim for the rape is a
critical step in creating and reinforcing the presumption of male innocence.
Equally important to that presumption, however, is the notion that some men
are not innocent. For example, Lynne Henderson notes that the presumption of
I d. at 77 (footnote omitted).
See Jo Dixon, Feminist Reforms and Sexual Coercion Laws, in SEXUAL COERCION: A
SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 161, 170 (Elizabeth Grauerholz &
Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) (criticizing liberal feminist characterization of rape as
"violence" rather than "sex" as making more difficult the prosecution of acquaintance rape,
which often lacks physical violence); Dorothy Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's
Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362 (1993) ("If rape is violence as the law defines it
(weapons, bruises, blood) then what most men do when they disregard women's sexual
autonomy is not rape."); Henderson, supra note 91, at 157 ("In calling rape 'violence,'
feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done from what the rapists
do, because they haven't caused external physical damage that they can understand as
violence.").
112 See MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 171-83 (discussing, inter alia, the relationship
between sex and violence and the roots of the subject's jurisprudence in social, political, and
economic male dominance); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 16-30 (describing the
history of the law of rape as rooted in male predations of women); Roberts, supra note 111,
at 369-81 (discussing the relationship between sex, power, and violence in the context of the
eroticisation of dominance).
"' See Torrey, Feminist Scholarship, supra note 101, at 46 (observing that feminists
have recently begun to focus their attention on the "myths of male innocence and female
guilt" and have emphasized men's responsibility for their own conduct).
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male innocence is reversed when a black man is accused of rape. 14 Thus, in
order to preserve a typical man's innocence while still acknowledging rape as a
crime, there also must exist an image of the type of man who does commit
rape. As discussed below, that image exists in the notion that rapists are
psychopathic, violent, sexually-compulsive (usually black) strangers.
The image of the rapist as psychopath has a long history in this country.
Early in the twentieth century, psychiatrists began to view sex offenders as
mental deviants with little ability to control their behavior or rehabilitate
themselves." 5 A series of sexual murders of children in the first half of the
century further popularized the image of the sexual psychopath. 116
Characterizing these events as "pathological," an article appearing in The
Nation argued that "abnormal sexual expression was at work in the land." 1 7 J.
Edgar Hoover similarly declared "war on the sex .criminal," suggesting that
"degenerate sex offenders .... depraved human beings more savage than
beasts are permitted to rove America almost at will. 11 8 Eventually, the image
of the sex offender as psychopath came to represent not only those who
victimized children but those who forcibly raped adult women. As Judge
Morris Ploscowe wrote in 1951:
Rape is a word of fearsome connotations. It calls forth visions of men
who lurk in dark alleys and hallways, in vacant lots and behind bushes,
ready to spring and attack the first female who passes by. It conjures up
pictures of women who have been brutally attacked by beasts in human
form and who have defended themselves to the point of death .... The
114 Lynne Henderson, Criminal Law Symposium: Commentary: Co-Opting Compassion:
The Federal Victims' Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 584 (noting that "the
image of the criminal is the ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, black or
Latino male" and that the "popular image of the 'criminal' certainly does not include a
white fraternity member who participates in the gang-rape of a young woman he knows").
115 See generally Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires:" The Response to the Sexual
Psychopath, 1920-1960, in PASSION & POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY (Kathy Peiss &
Christina Simmons eds., 1989). See also Aluise, supra note 59, at 167-68 (discussing
psychological theories of mid-twentieth century).
116 See Freedman, supra note 115, at 199 (discussing the media's obsession with violent
sexual murders during that period); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED:
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 144 (1996) (discussing the preoccupation with the notion of
the "sex psychopath" brought on by a "wave of brutal, seemingly sexually motivated child
murders" during' the 1930s). These murders set off nationwide "sex panics" regarding a
perceived increase in such crimes. J. Edgar Hoover, for example, claimed that "the most
rapidly increasing type of crime is that perpetrated by sex offenders." Freedman, supra note
115, at 205-06. Statistics, however, did not support his claim. See id. at 206 (noting the
"lack of evidence that the incidence of rape, child murder, or minor sex offenses has
increased").
117 SANDAY, supra note 116, at 144.
118 Id.
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rapist is an object of universal detestation.1 19
Judge Ploscowe's vivid picture persists today. Research by Joyce Williams
and Karen Holmes reveals that the public strongly embraces the belief that
rapists are "sick, emotionally disturbed men." 120 Most people also believe that
men commit rape out of sexual frustration and an inability to control
themselves, 121 thus reinforcing the notion of their psychopathy. In addition,
most people classify rape in narrow terms. Williams' and Holmes' research
revealed that of nine scenarios (eight of which legally constituted rape),
respondents asked to categorize the scenarios as rape could agree on only
one-the stereotypic violent street rape committed by a stranger with a
weapon. 122 Taken together, these beliefs reveal a public image of rapists as
"psychopaths lurking in dark alleys waiting to pounce on any likely victim and
inflict their uncontrollable desires upon her."' 23  Social science research
suggests that this image also prevails among members of the legal system,
including police officers, 124 prosecutors,125 judges, 126 and jurors. 127 Many rape
19 PLOSCOWE, supra note 86, at 165.
120 WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 118-19 (indicating that a large proportion of
the subjects participating in the authors' study believed rapists to be "crazy," "mentally ill,"
or "emotionally disturbed"). According to Williams & Holmes, 91% of white men and 92%
of white women, 83% of black men and 98% of black women, and 87% of Mexican-
American men and 63% of Mexican-American women believe that rapists are "sick." See
id. at 136.
The myth of the crazed rapist has had a particular impact on black men. See, e.g.,
EsTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 78, at 32 (noting that "one is hard pressed to find a
conviction of a stranger, let alone a black stranger, who jumped from the bushes and
attacked a virtuous white woman, reversed for lack of resistance"); BROWNMILLER, supra
note 90, at 216 (noting that in a study of rape convictions in Baltimore, "blacks received the
stiffest sentences for raping white women and the mildest sentences for raping black
women"); id. at 210-55 (chronicling "the mythified spectre of the black man as rapist");
Bumiller, supra note 109, at 86-88 (detailing the "pattern of excessive punishment for
interracial sexual assault [that] continued into the twentieth century") (footnote omitted).
This is not to say that the public believes that black men are mentally ill but that it is
willing to believe accusations against black men because of racist beliefs about their
uncontrollable and "animalistic" sexuality. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I:
Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 387,
453-57 (1996) (noting the widely held myth of black men "as in a 'state of savage
promiscuity"') (citations omitted).
121 See HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 55 (1980) (noting the
historical depiction of men as subject to uncontrollable sexual desires when stimulated by
women).
122 See WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 187; see also LAFREE, supra note 79, at 31
(noting the predominance of narrow perceptions of rape as a sudden, violent attack by a
stranger in a deserted public place).
123 Stevi Jackson, The Social Context of Rape, in RAPE & SOCIETY 16 (Patricia Searles &
Ronald J. Berger eds., 1995).
24 See Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police,
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victims characterize their experience as something other than rape because
they were not victimized in accordance with public perceptions of rape. 128
Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 169
(1978) (discussing police attitudes towards rapists including their belief, similar to that of
rapists themselves, that they are not mentally normal); Duncan Chappell & Susan Singer,
Rape in New York City: A Study of the Material in the Police Files and Its Meaning, in
FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM & THE OFFENDER 245 (Duncan Chappell et al.,
eds. 1977) (noting that New York police found 24% of acquaintance rape cases to be
without merit as opposed to only 5% of stranger rape cases); see also Estrich, Rape, supra
note 7, at 1087-88 (describing police officers' response to her rape by a stranger with a
weapon as legitimate because of circumstances).
125 Many prosecutors, like police, consider stranger rape to be more serious than
acquaintance rape and more vigorously pursue those cases. See, e.g., Robert A . Weninger,
Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis County, 64 VA. L. REV.
357, 380 (1978) (noting that "the probability of an indictment was highest in cases of
strangers and lower, not in cases of friends, but in those cases of acquaintances"); id. at 385
(suggesting that juries may demand greater evidence of nonconsent in acquaintance rape,
and "[tihese expectations of jury reaction seem likely to have influenced prosecutors'
perceptions of their chances for success at trial and, therefore, their decisions to indict"). To
be sure prosecutors' reluctance to pursue acquaintance rape cases could be related to their
belief in their likelihood of success at trial rather than to a firmly held belief regarding the
"crazed" nature of rapists. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1246-54 (discussing
prosecutorial disinclination to pursue "unwinnable" cases and noting that acquaintance rape
cases are more difficult to win than stranger rape cases). Even so, the decision to prosecute
is directly related to what a prosecutor thinks the public will believe. Given the public's
firmly held belief in the crazed rapist, prosecutors at least partly utilize the myth in their
decision-making. Moreover, prosecutors frequently use the image of rapist as "crazed
beast" in their arguments in stranger rape cases, thus solidifying the myth. See Lisa A.
Binder, "With More Than Admiration He Admired": Images of Beauty and Defilement in
Judicial Narratives of Rape, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 265, 274 (1995) (discussing and citing
instances of prosecutorial use of the image of rapists as beasts).
126 See WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 19 (citing a study of judicial attitudes
classifying "genuine" rape as those involving women attacked by "a stranger leaping out of
the shadows of a dark alley").
127 In a comprehensi've jury study, Professors Kalven and Zeisel revealed that juries were
far less likely to convict an accused man of rape when the rape was not stereotypical - i.e.,
where there was no extrinsic violence or multiple assailants and where the victim and
assailant knew one another. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
252-3 (1966); see also Biyden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 n.442 (citing later studies
tending to confirm Kalven & Zeisel's conclusions); FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 121, at 56
(study of potential jurors revealed that 85% viewed rapists as "not normal" and 57% viewed
them as mentally ill); Wenniger, supra note 125, at 370 (noting that the rape victim often
carried a greater burden because "grand jurors were especially inquisitive if a prior
relationship existed or if there was any question concerning consent to intercourse").
128 See Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1,
4 (1988) (57% of women surveyed who were raped did not realize that the sex in which they
were forced to engage was rape); WARSHAW, supra note 93, at 26 (only 26% of women
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Despite its prominence, the image of the crazed rapist is unsupported in fact.
First, as feminists have been pointing out for decades, most women are not
raped by strangers. While stranger rape clearly occurs, statistics indicate that
over seventy-five percent of rape victims are raped by someone they know.
129
Second, most men who rape adult women are neither mentally ill nor
compulsive. Social science studies suggest that "[l]ess than 5 percent of rapists
are psychotic at the time of the commission of the [rape].' 130 In addition,
despite sex offenders' claims of helplessness in the face of female sexuality,
there is no evidence that sex offenders are unable to control their actions.
131
As Katharine Baker notes, many researchers conclude that "men who rape are
'normal' to the extent that psychologists fail to find evidence of
abnormality. ' 132  In fact, men who rape are, from a psychopathology
standpoint, essentially indistinguishable from the male population as a
whole. 133 To be sure, men who rape do share some identifiable characteristics
surveyed whose sexual assault met the legal definition of rape thought of themselves as rape
victims).
129 See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 ("The National Women's Survey clearly
dispels the common myth that most women are raped by strangers."). The offender
statistics break down as follows: husbands or ex-husbands (9%), fathers or step-fathers
(11%), boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (10%), other relatives (16%), and non-relative
acquaintances (29%). See id.
130 G.G. Abel, J.V. Becker, & L.J. Skinner, Aggressive Behavior and Sex, 3 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS OFN. AM. 133, 140 (1980).
131 Steven J. Morse, Fear or Danger, Flight From Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 250, 263 (1998) ("Most arguments that facilely suggest that sexual impulses or desires, or
any other kind, are necessarily uncontrollable are conceptually and empirically
unsupported."). Many scholars note that while sexual offenders often claim to feel unable to
control their desires, there is "a considerable difference between a desire not resisted and an
irresistible desire." Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 521 (1998).
132 Baker, supra note 10, at 577. For studies regarding the "normality" of men who rape,
see James V. Check & Neil Malamuth, An Empirical Assessment of Some Feminist
Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 414,415 (1985).
133 See Paul Schewe & William O'Donohue, Rape Prevention: Methodological Problems
and New Directions, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY REV. 667, 668 (1972) ("At this point.., it
appears that deviant arousal may not be a necessary or sufficient cause of rape, as some
researchers have failed to find significant differences between rapist and nonrapist
populations."). Studies reporting that a substantial portion of college males indicate a
likelihood of committing rape if there were no negative consequences also support the
proposition that rapists are relatively normal. Check & Malamuth, supra note 132, at 416
(study found that 35% of men questioned would rape if they were assured of not getting
caught); Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 138, 140
(describing the results of the previously cited study). Moreover, a number of "normal"
college men have admitted to committing rape. See Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in 2
RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT 1, 11 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988) (nationwide survey of
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distinguishing them from the non-rapist population. Those characteristics,
however, tend to be socially constructed rather than related to
psychopathology. Thus, men who have raped or who admit to a likelihood of
committing rape have greater acceptance of rape myths, violence against
women, and sexual stereotypes. 134 Far from being mentally deviant, men who
rape have simply internalized certain cultural and sex role norms.
Third, men who rape are not abnormally dangerous in that they do not
commit their crimes at an appreciably higher rate than other criminals.
Statistics differ but all support the conclusion that rates of recidivism for rape
are no greater than for other crimes. 135 Although a rapist may be more likely
to commit another rape, 36 he is, at the very least, no different from other
criminals who show an even greater likelihood to commit similar crimes. 137
over 6100 college males revealed that I in 12 admitted to committing rape); Karen Rapaport
& C. Dale Posey, Sexually Coercive College Males, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87,
at 217, 219-20 (43% of college males surveyed admitted to engaging in coercive sex); see
also sources cited in Baker, supra note 10, at 576 n.61 (describing the results of the
Rapaport & Posey study and surveying the results of several other studies that "found lower,
but nonetheless startling percentages of men who admit to engaging in coercive sex").
134 See Check & Malamuth, supra note 132, at 415 (describing studies linking sexual
aggressivity to "socially acquired attitudes about rape, women, and sexual relations" and a
self-reported likelihood of committing rape to "acceptance of rape myths ... violence
against women, and sex-role stereotyping"); Mary P. Koss et al., Nonstranger Sexual
Aggression: A Discriminant Analysis of the Psychological Characteristics of Undetected
Offenders, 12 SEx ROLES 981, 989 (1985) (noting that sexually aggressive men are more
likely to "attribute adversarial qualities to interpersonal relationships, to accept sex-role
stereotypes, to believe myths about rape, to feel that rape prevention is the woman's
responsibility, and to view as normal an intermingling of aggression and sexuality").
115 See, e.g., PATRICK J. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF FELONS ON
PROBATION, 1986-1989, 6 (1992) (noting that while there exists "a tendency for offenders to
repeat the crime they were previously convicted of," the recidivism of rapists (3%) was no
greater than for those convicted of murder (5%), robbery (17%), or assault (9%)); ALLEN J.
BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989); Joseph
J. Romero & Linda Meyer Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex Offenders: A JO-
Year Follow-up Study, 49 FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1985, at 58 (noting that most early studies
did not reveal sex offenders to be "serious recidivists"). Several articles thoroughly survey
the numerous studies on recidivism rates. See Baker, supra note 10, at 578-80 (comparing
Bureau of Justice statistics for rape recidivism with statistics of recidivism for other crimes);
Aluise, supra note 59, at 173-84; Moreno, supra note 44, at 554-57 (citing various studies
and articles in support of the proposition that recidivism rates for sexual offenders are no
greater than those for other sorts of offenders).
136 See BECK, supra note 135, at 6 (finding that rapists are 10.5 times more likely to be
arrested for another rape than were criminals who had committed different crimes).
"I Beck found that 7.7% of convicted rapists were later rearrested for rape within three
years of their earlier conviction, as compared to 33.5% of larcenists who were rearrested for
larceny, 31.9% of burglars rearrested for burglary, 19.6% of robbers rearrested for robbery,
and 21.9% of aggressors rearrested for assault. See id.; see also LANGAN, supra note 135, at
6 (2.9% of rapists rearrested for rape, 12.2% of larcenists rearrested for larceny, 17.2% of
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Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that men who rape an
acquaintance are substantially less likely to recidivate than men who rape
strangers. While the lack of comprehensive studies on acquaintance rape
recidivism make it difficult to compare acquaintance rape recidivism rates with
the recidivism rates of men who rape strangers, research suggests that
perpetrators of acquaintance rape also recidivate. 138 A study of almost 3,000
male college students performed by researcher Mary Koss indicated that forty-
seven percent of the men who had committed rape, "stated that they expected
to engage in a similar assault at some point."' 39  A nationwide survey
conducted by the Ms. Foundation for Education and Communication and
funded by the National Institute of Mental Health further revealed that men
who had raped admitted to having engaged in that behavior with their victim
an average of 2.29 times. 40 Anecdotal evidence also supports this conclusion.
In Peggy Sanday's study of gang rape in college fraternities, for example, the
young men accused of raping a woman known to them clearly reveled in a
pattern of sexual aggression toward women.141 Likewise, the student athletes
accused of raping a fellow high school student in Glen Ridge, New Jersey were
known for their sexual exploitation and coercion of girls prior to the rape of
which they were accused. 142 Men who rape acquaintances thus appear to be
quite capable of repeating and do repeat their crimes.
Fourth, most rapes do not involve violence extrinsic to the rape itself. A
burglars rearrested for burglary, 17.3% of robbers rearrested for robbery, 9.4% of aggressors
rearrested for assault).
The feminist claim that most rapes go unreported casts some doubt on the relevance of
arrest statistics as a measure of recidivism. Self-reported data from sex offenders seems to
indicate a much higher rate of recidivism than found in the Beck and Langan studies, which
relied on arrest and conviction rates. See Aluise, supra note 59, at 181-83 (surveying
studies). However, this fact does not distinguish rapists from other criminals, many of
whom also committed unreported crimes prior to their first arrest or conviction. See Baker,
supra note 10, at 579.
138 Most studies of rape recidivism are based on re-arrest rates or self-reported
subsequent offenses of convicted sex offenders. The focus on men who have already been
convicted excludes most men who have committed acquaintance rape but who, for reasons
entirely unrelated to their guilt, are never arrested much less convicted. It is thus difficult to
determine whether they rape with more or less frequency than do men who sexually assault
strangers.
139 Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National
Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE & SOCIETY, supra note 123, at 45.
140 See WARSHAW, supra note 93, at 63 (stating the results of the cited survey).
141 See PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE 46-47, 56-59 (1990)
(describing the manner in which the accused men's sexual exploits are used as tools for
gaining status within their fraternity).
142 BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR Guys: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF
THE PERFECT SUBURB 146-48 (1997) (chronicling how several high school students who
were later accused of sexually assaulting a mentally retarded classmate frequently
physically and emotionally abused other female students).
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comprehensive nationwide study revealed that over two-thirds of rapes involve
no physical injury other than the rape itself and only four percent involved
serious physical injuries. 143 According to a 1991 report by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, only fifteen percent of non-stranger rape and thirty percent of
stranger rape cases involved a weapon. 44 The lack of extrinsic violence or the
failure to use a weapon, however does not mean that non-violent assailants
145
are less dangerous or that the victims are less affected by the rape. Nearly half
of the victims of one survey admitted to being afraid of serious injury or death
even absent overt violence, 146 and many women remain passive during assaults
because they are caught off guard, frightened, or are trying to avoid what they
perceive might become a violent attack. 147 The assumption that rape must
include excessive violence ignores the fact that "men's greater size and
strength are in themselves threatening to women and are often enough either to
intimidate the victim or overcome her resistance." 148 The equation of rape and
extrinsic violence further diminishes the very real psychological harms that
victims of non-violent acquaintance rape suffer, which are often comparable to
victims of stranger rape. 149 If anything, research reveals that the psychological
impact of victimization by an acquaintance is particularly severe as it
represents a betrayal of trust. 150
None of the above is meant to imply that the "crazed rapist" does not exist.
Nor do we mean to diminish the harms suffered by women victimized by such
143 See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that "[a]nother common
misconception about rape is that most victims sustain serious physical injuries").
144 CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES
12(1991).
145 We recognize that the term "non-violent" rape is an oxymoron. See generally Lynne
Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Non-Violent
Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439 (1993) (discussing the relationship between the terming
of rapes as violent or non-violent and the resulting sentences imposed). However, we use it
to distinguish between rapes accompanied by overt extrinsic violence or weapons and those
which are not.
146 See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that 49% of rape victims
surveyed "described being fearful of serious injury during the rape").
147 Lynne Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 979, 990-91 (1993) (discussing reasons why some rape victims do not physically
resist).
" Id. at 990 (emphasis omitted).
149 Koss, Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, supra note 128, at 13 (noting that victims of
acquaintance and stranger rape did not differ markedly in their psychological symptoms,
which included depression, anxiety, and a decrease in relationship and sexual satisfaction).
Koss and her colleagues concluded that there existed a "lingering, potentially clinically
significant [psychological] impact of rape which did not vary in severity according to the
victim-offender relationship." Id. at 22.
150 Massaro, supra note 8, at 429; Schafran, supra note 145, at 1018-20 (analyzing
statistical data on the impact of the different types of rape on the victims).
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men. We do argue, however, that such rapists and rape situations are an
extraordinarily small number of all rapes. The enormous amount of attention
devoted to rapes committed by such men reinforces the "crazed rapist" myth
and substantially hinders efforts to prosecute acquaintance rape because it
diverges from the common perception of rape.' 5' Eradication of this myth and
laws that reflect it is as essential to broadening rape prosecutions as the
eradication of victim myths, perhaps even more so given the widely-held
perception that the most prevalent cause of rape is the rapist's mental or
emotional disturbance. 152 The next section examines the manner in which the
new legislation embraces the myth and, consequently, undermines the feminist
agenda regarding rape.
III. THE CRAZED RAPIST MYTH AND THE NEW LEGISLATION
On some level, the legislation discussed in Part I is consistent with the
feminist agenda. The new FRE, for example, attempt to bolster a complaining
victim's testimony to overcome the rape myth that women lie.' 53 Similarly,
VAWA's grounding of the civil rights action in a bias crime paradigm reflects
a feminist view of rape as pervasive and hateful.154 One can even say that
registration, notification, and sexual predator laws recognize that sentences for
rape are woefully short and thus attempt to provide some manner of protecting
women from further assaults. By accepting the myth of the crazed rapist,
however, the new legislation ultimately works counter to the feminist agenda's
effort to expand the notion of rape and to remove obstacles lying in the path of
rape prosecutions.
A. Registration and Notification Laws
Registration and notification laws undoubtedly embrace the myth of the
crazed rapist. Many of such laws explicitly justify their existence in terms of
the dangerous and psychopathic nature of the sexual offender. New Jersey's
law, for example, states that "[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex
offenders.., and the dangers posed by persons who prey on others as a result
151 Bechhofer & Parrot, supra note 90, at 10 (noting that, contrary to the common
understanding of the stereotypical rape, date rape or acquaintance rape is much more
common); id. at 27 (noting the difference between date rape and so-called "real" rape).
152 WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that mental illness ranked first as a
reason for rape among whites, blacks, and victims of rape, and second behind the woman's
appearance and behavior among Mexican-Americans).
153 See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 687-90 (canvassing feminist arguments in support of
FRE 413); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing "The
Credibility Quotient," 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 107, 124-27 (1995) (arguing that FRE 413 is
necessary to eradicate the myth of the lying woman).
154 See Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 124 (noting that "[e]nactment of the Civil Rights
Remedy reflects increased acceptance of the feminist position that crimes such as rape and
sexual assault are bias crimes that violate women's civil rights").
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of mental illness, require a system of registration that will permit law
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the
public safety."' 55 New York's registration law similarly bases its necessity in
the "danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders, especially those sexually
violent offenders who commit predatory acts characterized by repetitive and
compulsive behavior."' 156 Additionally, the laws are a response to several high-
profile and admittedly heinous rape/murders of children by strangers or near-
strangers with previous sex crime convictions. 157 Thus, the statutes presume
an image of sexual offenders as monstrous individuals, incapable of controlling
themselves and preying on the helpless (usually children). The notification
laws' grounding in the crazed rapist paradigm substantially undercuts feminist
efforts to broaden our understanding of rape although they do so differently
depending on the type of notification required.
The federal law and many state laws, for example, involve single-tier
notification statutes that require broad public disclosure regarding any
defendant convicted of forcible rape, 158 including any man convicted of
acquaintance rape. The disconnection between the crazed rapist image
prompting the statutes and the actual incidence of rape may lead to differential
155 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1994).
156 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (statement of Legislative
Findings and Intent).
157 See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 794-95 (discussing incidents spurring laws).
Indeed, many such laws are named after especially well-known victims. The shorthand
term for them-"Megan's laws"-is highly recognizable as referring to Megan Kanka, a
young, New Jersey girl raped and killed by a new neighbor with two previous convictions
for sexual assault of minors. See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the
Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y, 569, 569-71
(1995) (describing the crime and the perpetrator and how the law became named after the
victim). The incident was highly publicized in national newspapers. See, e.g., Man
Charged in 7-Year-Old Neighbor's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at B5; Suspect
Confessed in the Murder of a 7-Year-Old, Prosecutors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2 1994, at B2;
Jan Hoffman, New Law is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at B 1,
B7. Within three months the New Jersey legislator enacted a law requiring registration of
sex offenders. See Ryan A. Boldan, Note, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification: Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (1995). The
federal law, named the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program, is similarly named after a child victim. Lewis, supra note
32, at 91.
58 The Jacob Wetterling Act encourages states to enact registration and notification laws
applicable to, among others, persons convicted of a "sexually violent offense." See Lewis,
supra note 32, at 94 (noting that failure to enact registration laws results in the state losing
10% of its funding from the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act). The
federal guidelines further make clear that the purpose of the latter phrase is "to require
registration of persons convicted of rape or rape-like offenses." Megan's Law; Final
Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 577 (1999).
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treatment of sex offenders by courts unwilling to publicly brand seemingly
"normal" men as monsters. Although rationalized as a method of protecting
the public, 159 the registration and notification laws are quite stigmatizing.
Scholars acknowledge that public notification of a convicted sex offender's
status subjects him to public opprobrium. 160 Although many courts reject
constitutional challenges to registration and notification laws, 161 they too
recognize that the laws have a stigmatizing effect. 162 Moreover, sex offenders
whose status has been made public are often subject to harassment and
ostracism from the community. 163 While courts generally reject constitutional
challenges based upon this stigma and potential violence, 164 the philosophical
159 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 373-77 (N.J. 1995) (finding that laws are designed
to protect society from sexual predators by informing the public of their presence); Simeon
Schopf, "Megan's Law:" Community Notification and the Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 117, 131 (1995) ("[Tlhe purpose of 'Megan's law' is to facilitate the protection
of the community and its children.").
60 See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due
Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1167, 1193-94 (1999) (noting that "notification entails a more acute and sustained harm
.... and, depending on applicable law, [the offender] can suffer this public ignominy well
past the end of their prison sentence, and, indeed, for the rest of their lives"); Mel L.
Greenberg, Just Deserts in an Unjust Society: Limitations on Law as a Method of Social
Control, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 333, 338-39 (1997) (noting that
constitutional questions arising from the Massachusetts registration statute have yet to be
addressed by the courts); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, 813-14 (noting that the California
Supreme Court has found that questioning of those registered when a similar crime occurs
constitutes an "affirmative disability").
161 See cases cited infra note 164.
162 See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the
"stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the 'sex offender' label"); Poritz, 662 A.2d
at 419 (noting that public notification "would expose plaintiff to public opprobrium, not
only by identifying him as a sex offender but also by labeling him as potentially currently
dangerous, and thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community").
163 See Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are The People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process,
Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1467-69
(detailing accounts of vigilantism against sex offenders or alleged sex offenders as a result
of notification programs); Mark E. Rath, Comment, Michigan's Scarlet Letter Laws: Are
Changes In Order?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 291, 291 (1998) (describing attacks on
registered sex offenders by members of the community in which they have moved);
Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When
a Convicted Child Molester is Released Into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 715
(1995) (detailing the burning of a registered offender's home in Washington less than a day
before his scheduled release).
16 Courts have rejected claims that notification statutes violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, see, e.g., Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174,
193 (D. Mass. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Poritz,
662 A.2d at 405, the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy clauses, see, e.g., Russell v.
Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ex Post Facto only); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d
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questions nevertheless remain. 165  Society may tolerate the questionable
aspects of registration and notification laws as long as the defendant appears
monstrous (i.e., a real rapist) rather than human. 166 When, however, the person
publicly branded is not a sadistic pedophile or excessively violent but a college
student convicted of raping a young woman at a fraternity party, the potential
constitutional and stigmatic defects seem far more severe and his possible
ruination that much more unreasonable. State v. Scott167 reflects the manner in
which some courts may try to avoid such ruination.
In Scott, the defendant pleaded no contest to attempted aggravated sexual
battery, a crime requiring registration and disclosure under Kansas law. 168 His
plea agreement resulted from an incident in which he assaulted a female friend
at her apartment where the two apparently had been drinking alcohol and
1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (Ex Post Facto only); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d.
Cir. 1997); Spencer v. O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Poritz, 662
A.2d at 404-05, the equal protection clause, see, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d
1235, 1267-68 (3d Cir. 1996); Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 195, Poritz, 662 A.2d at 413, and the
Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1558 (9th Cir. 1995); Rowe v.
Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Alaska 1994). Courts have had more difficulty
resolving claims that notification statutes provide insufficient due process protection.
Compare Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480-82 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that
defendant did not have a protectible liberty interest implicating due process rights),
Femedeer v. Haun, 35 F. Supp.2d. 852, 859 (D. Utah 1999) (same) and Lanni v. Engler, 994
F. Supp. 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same) with Shimoda, 131 F.3d at 830 (holding that
notification implicated liberty interests for due process purposes), Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411
(same), Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (same) and Doe v.
Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1014 (Mass. 1997) (same).
165 Despite court rulings, numerous commentators question the constitutionality of
registration and notification laws. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 160, at 1197-1212
(discussing the degree to which notification laws impact registrants' lives in comparison
with laws that created lesser stigmas that nevertheless received procedural due process
safeguards); Stephen R. McAllister, Megan's Laws: Wise Public Policy or Ill-Considered
Public Folly, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 19-20 (1998) (discussing potential ex post facto
violations); Small, supra note 163, at 1486-92 (discussing potential procedural due process
violation); Rath, supra note 163, at 304-14 (discussing ex post facto violations resulting
from community notification); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 815-49 (discussing cruel and
unusual punishment and due process violations); Bedarf, supra note 31, at 924-39
(discussing cruel and unusual punishment problems).
166 This is not to say that we should use different standards for such defendants. As
Stephen Schulhofer notes, however, society is more willing to heap harsh sentences on
criminal defendants it can describe as "someone hostile to civilized values, devoid of human
sensibilities, utterly 'other."' Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials: The Trouble
With Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 852 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME: VICTIM'S RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)).
167 947 P.2d 466 (Kan Ct. App. 1997), rev'd 961 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1998).
168 Scott, 947 P.2d at 468.
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watching television. 169 The victim had retired for the night, leaving Scott
watching television. 70 He later entered her bedroom and sexually assaulted
her, ultimately bloodying her nose and breaking several of her ribs in the
ensuing struggle. 171 Scott challenged the public disclosure requirement as
applied to him, claiming that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The
appellate court agreed. Noting that the disclosure provision likely would result
in "isolation, harassment, [and] loss of opportunities"' 72 for defendant, the
court held that the punishment inflicted was disproportionate to Scott's crime:
There is no evidence in the record to support a reasonable inference that
Scott is a repeat sex offender posing a danger to the community. To the
contrary, the record strongly suggests that Scott, in an intoxicated
condition, impulsively committed a serious violent crime against the
victim under very situational circumstances not likely to arise in the
future. Scott is not a pedophile or a child molester, and there is no
indication that he has a mental illness or personality disorder that would
suggest he will reoffend. Scott is being required to register as a sex
offender solely because of the crime he committed, with no risk
assessment whatsoever. We further note the incongruity in [defendant's]
minimal sentence of 14 months with presumptive probation, while at the
same time requiring [him] to register as a sex offender for 10 years. The
guiding principle of the Kansas sentencing guidelines is to put violent
offenders in prison, with nonviolent offenders granted probation. The
inconsistency in these two punishments is difficult to reconcile. 7 3
The influence of the crazed rapist myth on Scott is apparent. Although Scott
committed the crime while drunk (an easily repeated behavior that normally
does not excuse crime) and broke the bones of a woman who once considered
him a friend (one of the few rapes with extrinsic physical injuries), Scott was
not a violent, compulsive, mentally ill sex offender posing a threat to the
community. 74 Rather, the appellate panel found him to be a normal, if
somewhat misguided, young man undeserving of the stigma caused by the
notification requirement. The court's refusal to see Scott's dangerousness and
its perception of the notification requirement's stigmatic effect on him reflects
the disconnection between the defendant and the paradigmatic crazed rapist. It
169 Id. at 468.
170 See id.
171 See id.; State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 668 (Kan. 1998) (noting that the victim had a
bloody nose and several bruises on her face, arms and legs in addition to broken ribs).
172 Scott, 947 P.2d at 470.
171 Id. at 470-71.
114 Eventually, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, noting that "Scott
committed a very violent crime after an acquaintance refused to have sex with him", Scott,
961 P.2d at 673, and that the statute's "punitive effect.., resulting from an interest in
public safety [were] not so disproportionate to Scott's violent, sexually motivated crime"
that it violated the prohibition against cruel and inhumane punishment. Id. at 673-76.
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further bears a striking resemblance to earlier courts' attitudes and
manipulative practices so heavily criticized by feminists. 75
Not all notification statues raise the Scott problem. Rather than requiring
public disclosure of all sex offenders, and thus encouraging courts to
manipulate the statute when "normal" men are involved, states with three-
tiered registration statutes allow disclosure of offender status to the general
public only with the most egregious sex offenders. 176 With notification to the
general public limited to those most likely to re-offend, 177 there is less
likelihood that courts will engage in the sleight-of-hand practiced by the Scott
court. To that extent, such statutes do not force courts to formalize the twisted
logic of earlier courts and the Scott court. Nevertheless, these statutes build
upon the crazed rapist myth in a manner that detracts from the feminist agenda
regarding rape.
In New Jersey, the prototypical tiered-classification state, the factors to be
used by the prosecutor to determine an offenders' risk of re-offense include (1)
release conditions minimizing the risk of re-offense, such as parole supervision
or psychiatric treatment, (2) physical conditions minimizing the risk of re-
offense, such as old age or illness, (3) whether psychological profiles present a
risk of recidivism, and (4) criminal history factors, including whether the
offender served the maximum term, whether he committed a sex offense
against a child, whether his conduct involved repetitive or compulsive
behavior, whether his crime involved the use of a weapon, violence or
infliction of serious bodily injury, the status of his relationship with the victim,
and the number and date of prior offenses. 78 While some of the listed factors
bear a relationship to risk of re-offense (e.g., release and physical conditions),
many of them do not. Instead, they represent subjective judgments that are too
easily manipulated to reflect stereotypical beliefs regarding who is
"dangerous."
There is no evidence, for example, that the relationship between the victim
175 See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
176 In states such as New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts, all sex offenders must
register but their period of registration and the entities to whom their status is disclosed
differ. Thus, Tier 1, or non-egregious sex offenders, are known only to the police and other
law enforcement officials, while Tier 3, the most egregious sex offenders, are subject to
widespread public disclosure regarding their status. See supra note 26.
117 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(c) (West 1994).
178 N.J. ANN. STAT. §2C:7-8(b) (West 1994); see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 1681(5)
(McKinney 1995) (listing factors similar to New Jersey Law). Unlike the New Jersey
requirements, the New York law merely lists some, but not necessarily all, of the factors to
be used by the board directed to establish guidelines for tier assessment. See Doe v. Pataki,
120 F.3d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1997). Elaborating on the New York law, the board created a
multi-factor assessment guide with factors similar to the New Jersey statute, including,
among others the defendant's use of violence, number of victims, age of the victim,
relationship between offender and victim, and the number and nature of prior crimes. See
id. at 1268 n.6.
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and attacker affects recidivism rates. If anything, there is much evidence that
the victim/offender relationship is not relevant to whether an offender will
recidivate 179 Focusing on that relationship in determining which tier to place a
sex offender allows prosecutors and other law enforcement officials to excuse
men they believe are less "bad" not necessarily those who are less likely to re-
offend. It buys into the myth that stranger rapists are the only "real" rapists
and the only ones of which the public needs to be made aware.
Other factors in the statute similarly reflect stereotypical beliefs regarding
men who rape. The focus on prior convictions as an indicator of
dangerousness reflects a strong bias against acquaintance rape. Any
consideration given to this factor will surely catch stranger rapists, who are the
most likely offenders to have past convictions. Reliance on that factor ignores,
however, perpetrators of acquaintance rape, who also may repeat their crimes
but who are rarely convicted of them. Similarly, the statute's focus on the
presence of a weapon or extrinsic violence as criteria reinforces the notion that
real rape involves a violently assaulted and physically injured woman who
barely survives the machinations of a murderous lunatic. Like traditional rape
law, reliance on this factor reflects a particularly male view of "violence,"
ignoring women's view of dangerousness and discounting the emotional
injuries that result from rape aside from physical harm.180
Reliance on factors such as those discussed above will not result in the most
dangerous offenders receiving the "high risk of re-offense" designation that
triggers public disclosure. Instead, it will result in the most stereotypical
offenders receiving that designation. 181 In turn, the public will hear only of
those sex offenders, thus reinforcing the commonly-held myth and cementing
barriers to prosecution of acquaintance rape.
B. Sexual Predator Laws
Laws requiring the indefinite civil commitment of certain sexual predators
similarly reinforce the myth of the crazed rapist. The avowed purpose of such
laws is to protect society from its "most dangerous" criminals. 182 Taken in
179 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of recidivism in
acquaintance rapists).
180 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing the common
misconception that the absence of extrinsic violence means women do not suffer severe
psychological harm as the result of rape).
18 For example, if the Scott court had been considering defendant's challenge to his
classification as an egregious sex offender rather than a constitutional challenge to the
notification statute generally, its reasoning is unlikely to have changed.
182 In hearings before the Minnesota legislature regarding the commitment of sexual
predators, for example, the state attorney general characterized the issue as how to "protect
the public from some of the most dangerous criminals in society." Eric Janus, Sex Offender
Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 71, 80 (1997) [hereinafter Janus, Sex Offender Commitments] (quoting
Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey, III). Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme
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isolation, that goal is not problematic-the state has legitimate public safety
interests in protecting against dangerousness and calibrating its protection to
perceived degrees of dangerousness, 183 Sexual predator statutes, however,
make assumptions regarding dangerousness that rely more on the crazed rapist
myth than on fact.
This is most obviously true with those statutes providing for commitment of
offenders who suffer from a mental defect that makes them likely to commit
future "predatory acts of sexual violence." Such statutes generally define
"predatory acts of sexual violence" as acts directed only to strangers or to a
person with whom the offenders have formed a relationship specifically for the
purpose of victimization. 184 In other words, the victim's status is a critical
aspect of the determination of dangerousness for commitment purposes. As
discussed above, however, the status of the victim is not related to the
dangerousness of sex offenders. 185 Whether the victim is a stranger or an
Court characterized its sexually violent predator statute as applying to "distinctively
dangerous" and "only the most dangerous of sex offenders." State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115,
124, 130 (Wis. 1995). The preambles of various statutes also refer to the "extremely
dangerous" group of criminals subject to the statute. See supra note 40.
"I There is controversy, however, regarding whether the State may use civil
commitment procedures to protect against dangerousness in the absence of mental illness.
The Court has indicated the State could not do so. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86
(1992) (overturning a Louisiana rule requiring commitment of defendants found not guilty
by reason of insanity until the defendant can show he or she is not dangerous to society,
even if they are no longer insane). However, in upholding Kansas's sexual predator
statute-which allows commitment based upon dangerousness and something less than
mental illness, the Supreme Court cast some doubt on whether serious mental illness is
necessary to support civil commitment proceedings. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 359-60 (1997) (holding that states could set their own criteria for defining who should
be civilly confined). Many scholars disagree with Hendricks, characterizing sexual predator
statutes as penalogical or punitive in nature and, thus, deserving of criminal procedural
protections. See, e.g, Cynthia A. King, Fighting the Devil We Don't Know: Kansas v.
Hendricks, A Case Study Exploring the Civilization of Criminal Punishment and Its
Ineffectiveness in Prevent Child Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1427, 1440-51
(1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Hendricks); Moreno, supra note 44, at
544-47 (noting that Justice Thomas' opinion upheld the statute in Hendricks while refuting
the only possible bases for its legitimacy); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social
Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to
Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 94-96 (1996) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Two Systems] (disagreeing with the Court's allowance of civil confinement
absent mental illness). The civil/criminal debate regarding sexual predator statutes is
beyond the scope of this article, although we generally concur with the scholars listed
above.
184 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a), (e) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
632.480(3) (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(4) (West 1998).
185 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (noting that there is significant
evidence that acquaintance rapists recidivate as often as stranger rapists).
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acquaintance has little bearing on whether the man who rapes her is likely to
recidivate or on the extent of the damage caused by the rape-the two factors
most often associated with danger. Sexual predator statutes with such
limitations ignore the bulk of potentially dangerous sex offenders 8 6 and
solidify antiquated notions that acquaintance rape is a wholly different caliber
of crime.187
Admittedly, some sexual predator statutes are not so limited. Kansas, for
example, defines "sexually violent predators" as those who have "a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes [them] likely to engage in
repeat acts of sexual violence."' 88  To that extent, such statutes do not
explicitly equate stranger rape and dangerousness. Nevertheless, these
statutes, by conditioning commitment on the existence of a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder," reinforce the myth of the crazed rapist.
At the outset, we want to emphasize that we do not argue that a sex offender
who is truly mentally ill, one whose "impaired psychological process renders
[him] incapable of ... adequate functioning,"'189 should not be the subject of
civil commitment proceedings. Men essentially divorced from reality who
distinctly manifest the potential for sexual violence may be sufficiently
dangerous to warrant such commitment. If such men are truly mentally ill,
however, they can be committed under existing statutes designed to allow
involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons regardless of their commission
186 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
187 See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 82 (1987) (noting that injuries
particular to women, such as rape and sexual harassment, are often conceived of as private
issues rather than legal injuries capable of redress).
188 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West Supp. 1999); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 123A § I (West Supp. 2000) (defining "sexually dangerous person" to include juvenile
delinquents, people charged with sexual offenses who suffer from mental abnormalities, and
people previously adjudicated as "sexually dangerous" and whose behavior indicates
inability to control their sexual impulses).
189 Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System:
Expanding the Normative Focus on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 161, 170 (1995). Although courts have never settled on a single definition of mental
illness, the definition in the text generally tracks the description of legal insanity.
Physicians and psychologists define serious mental illness in a similar manner. See Brief
for the National Mental Health Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) ("The term mental illness is
reserved for psychological conditions that impair virtually every aspect of the lives of
people it affects. It does not apply to those who merely cannot resist deviant sexual urges
whose origin, in any case, is unrelated to medical illness."); Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual
Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72
IND. L.J. 157, 187 (1996) [hereinafter Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence] (serious mental
illness for typical civil commitment proceedings is that illness which "renders the individual
substantially disconnected with reality").
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of a crime. 190 The critical aspect of sexual predator statutes, and their harm to
the feminist agenda, comes in their reach beyond existing civil commitment
regimes to allow involuntary detention of sex offenders who are not seriously
mentally ill.
Many sexual predator statutes openly acknowledge that they apply to "a
small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators.., who do
not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for...
existing involuntary treatment [regimes]."' 19 1 Such statutes thus expand their
application to include men who have a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder," with the former term defined as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses .... ",192 Under sexual predator statutes, then,
an offender is subject to involuntary commitment merely if he has a condition
of indefinite origin, which affects his emotional or volitional control. Such a
definition encompasses virtually any "condition of mind, body or
personality"'193 and renders useless the "mental abnormality" limitation. As a
result, the true determinant of whether an offender is appropriate for
commitment becomes whether he is predisposed to commit sexually violent
offenses. 194
190 See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 70 (commenting that all states allow
civil commitment of persons who are "mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others").
'91 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.090 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added);
see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5 9-29a0l (West 1999) ("Because the existing civil commitment
procedures ... are inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and
the risks they present to society ... a separate involuntary civil commitment process ... is
necessary.").
192 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); see also, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a02(b) (West 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(3) (West 1988 & Supp.
2000). The term "personality disorder" is rarely defined at all. To the extent the term is
defined, it is usually so circular as to be meaningless. See MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 §
I (West Supp. 2000) (defining "personality disorder" as a "congenital or acquired physical
or mental condition that results in a general lack of power to control sexual impulses").
113 Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95; Samuel Jan Brakel & James L.
Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex
Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 78 (2000) (arguing that the scope of the
statutes is not limited to the mentally ill). In fact, a large portion of committed sex offenders
are diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder which has been extremely controversial
in the mental health field because it does little more than indicate "that an individual is
predisposed to committing unlawful, irresponsible acts." Andrew Hammel, Comment, The
Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex
Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUSTON L. REV. 775, 808-09 (1995); see also Janus, Sex
Offender Commitments, supra note 182, at 74 n.74 (citing sources questioning the diagnosis
of anti-social personality disorder).
"I See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95 ("In effect, the predictive
component of the definition is not only necessary but in practice sufficient; the mental
disorder component imposes no limitation at all."); see also Jonathan Simon, Monstrous,
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. The absence of a true mental illness component and reliance on predictions
regarding recidivism reinforce the crazed rapist myth. Officials are forced to
conclude that a particular offender has a mental abnormality predisposing him
to commit sex offenses simply because he has committed sex offenses in the
past. Thus, any determination regarding commitment is likely to fall most
heavily on those who have been deemed sufficiently bad to warrant previous
rape prosecutions and convictions-generally, those who have used extrinsic
violence or those who rape victims who are unknown to them. As with statutes
explicitly limited to stranger rape situations, these statutes ignore the large
number of men who rape acquaintances (sometimes repeatedly) but who
escape conviction. Their requirements of extrinsic violence in order to label a
rape dangerous also serves to trivialize the violence caused by the rape itself.
In addition, the hollowness of the mental abnormality/personality disorder
requirement and its dependence on past convictions essentially amounts to a
legislative declaration that sex offenses are their own psychopathology.195
Such a declaration reeks of earlier sentiments that rapists would not rape unless
they were mentally ill1 96 and encourages society and law enforcement officials
to excuse those men who do not seem mentally ill.
Arguably the presence of mental health officials in the commitment process
can assuage problems resulting from the emptiness of the mental abnormality
requirement. Sexual predator statutes generally require a psychological
evaluation of the offender in order to support commitment. Although the
standards in the statutes themselves are hollow, a mental health professional
with personalized knowledge of an individual offender may adequately be able
to assess his dangerousness and its relationship to a mental abnormality or
personality disorder. 197 Unfortunately, most laws operate to minimize the role
supra note 27, at 460 ("The logic of [sexual predator laws] is one based on statistical
evidence about recidivism rather than on clinical judgments about individual proclivities.").
195 Some states explicitly make this declaration. Tennessee, for example, declares that
"[s]ex offenders constitute a species of mentally ill persons in the eyes of the general
assembly," some of whom are appropriate for civil commitment. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-
302 (1984). States acknowledging that their sexual predator statutes apply only to "a small
but extremely dangerous group" of offenders, see supra note 40 (quoting Washington
statute), send a more conflicting message. Their open acknowledgment regarding the small
population to which they apply arguably belies the concept of sex offenses as their own
psychopathology. However, the emptiness of the mental health definitions in such statutes
and their reliance on recidivism as the only predictor for mental abnormality indicates an
underlying vision of all sex offenders as mentally ill, although only some might be
appropriate for commitment.
196 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 735 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("Common sense
dictates that most sex crimes are the result of a mental or an emotional state not often
terminated by one act.").
197 This proposition is not without controversy. Many mental health officials argue that
predicting future criminal behavior from past acts is difficult and often inaccurate. See
Winick, supra note 131, at 559 (arguing that the accuracy of clinical predictions has been
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and expertise of mental health professionals.
Several states put the initial determination of appropriateness for
commitment in the hands of law enforcement officials, such as the presiding
judge, prosecuting attorney, or prison officials. Only after this initial
identification is the offender referred to a mental health professional for
evaluation. 198 Law enforcement officials who make the initial determination
that an offender is a "sexually violent predator" have no mental health
expertise and are unlikely to have personalized knowledge of an individual
offender.199 Faced with culling a huge pool of sex offenders into the small
number subject to commitment, 200 such officials are more likely to rely on
visceral and stereotyped images of offenders, like those described above,
"seriously questioned"). Others, however, argue that carefully constructed models assessing
risk in light of an offender's particular characteristics and on-going behavior may
adequately predict the potential for future violence. See id. at 560-61 (suggesting that
information concerning an individual developed over time can predict the risk of violent
behavior and perhaps reduce that risk).
198 In Kansas, for example, the agency with custody of the offender initially identifies
him as potentially sexually violent predator. The agency then refers the case to the
prosecutor's review committee (a multi-disciplinary team composed of unidentified state
agency representatives), who, upon determination that the individual is a sexually violent
predator, refers it to the Attorney General who may file a petition requesting that a court
find probable cause to make a determination regarding the offender's status. If the court
finds probable cause to believe the offender is a sexually violent predator, it will refer the
offender to a professionally qualified evaluator to determine the offender's status. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03-05 (West Supp. 1999). In Colorado, the procedure is less
complex. After a defendant is convicted of a sex offense, the court, district attorney, or
defendant can request that commitment proceedings begin. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
16-13-205 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (commitment proceeding can being within twenty days
after conviction). After those proceedings begin, the defendant is subject to a mental health
evaluation. See id. § 16-13-207 ("The examining psychiatrists shall make independent
written reports to the court which shall contain the opinion of the psychiatrist as to whether
the defendant, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public.").
For a review of statutes operating similarly to those in Colorado and Kansas, see supra note
37.
199 In surveying recent commitment cases, Samuel Brakel and James Cavanaugh found
that the first step in the assessment process is:
[I]n effect a rough screen to determine if there is enough in the offender's background
and character to warrant that he will reoffend. The emphasis at this stage is on
actuarial rather than clinical methods and the inquiries may be performed by evaluators
with only modest, or no, clinical training. A review of the offender's file alone may
suffice to weed him out.
Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 79.
200 See id. at 79 (asserting that referral rates of sex offenders for civil commitment
hearings ranged from approximately 7% to 5% of all offenders and that rates of actual
commitments of those referred were even lower); see also Janus, Preventing Sexual
Violence, supra note 189, at 192 n.74 (noting that only 6% of sex offenders in Minnesota
were committed).
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which will prove both over- and under-inclusive of the most dangerous
offenders. 20' Although mental health officials may later determine that
someone is inappropriate for commitment, there is some evidence that they are
more reluctant to do so when another person has already identified the offender
as dangerous. 20 2 Moreover, to the extent that mental health officials suggest
that an identified sexual predator is inappropriate for commitment, courts are
free to, and periodically do, disregard their assessment. 20 3 In effect, the
decision to commit an offender as a sexually violent predator lies squarely with
law enforcement rather than mental health officials. 2°4 Thus, sexual predator
laws do little to avoid reinforcement of rape stereotypes.
C. Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
Unlike registration, notification, and sexual predator statutes, which entirely
stem from traditional stereotypes regarding rape perpetrators, FRE 413-415
embrace both traditional stereotypes and feminist notions about rape. In
support of the new rules, for example, proponents adopted feminist arguments
regarding the frequent credibility problems that acquaintance rape victims face
as a result of the ever-present consent defense.20 5 However, they also relied
heavily on the myth that rapists are a "small class of depraved criminals '20 6
who recidivate more than other offenders, thus justifying use of propensity
evidence. 20 7 Although their feminist goals are laudable, supporters ultimately
undercut their agenda by justifying the new rules partly on traditional rape
stereotypes. Although courts have allowed evidence of past acts under the new
rules, as discussed below they have done so almost exclusively in cases
involving stranger rape or child molestation. Adult victims of sexual
misconduct by an acquaintance, 20 8 which is the group identified as benefiting
201 See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 91 (noting that the "laws will miss
committing many who will reoffend and they will commit an undiscernible number who
would not have reoffended if left free").
202 See Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 189, at 202-03 (arguing that
several factors, such as fear of liability from a false prediction of safety and hindsight bias,
induce officials to find an offender dangerous).
203 A study in Minnesota, for example, revealed that in "seventeen of fifty-five cases
resulting in commitment, the trial court ordered the individual indeterminately committed
despite testimony from the evaluating hospital staff that either recommended against
commitment, or was neutral on the subject of commitment." Id. at 205.
204 See Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 458 (arguing that although the trial
includes examination by mental health professionals, the "underlying inquiry" is left to the
jury).
205 See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing rape myths and reliance on
the victim's character as evidence of consent).
206 Karp, supra note 60, at 24.
207 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing supporters' arguments in
favor of FRE 413-415).
208 We use the term "sexual misconduct" to signify that the rules apply not only to sexual
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the most from the rules, rarely see such results.
The general rule barring the use of character evidence at trials is an
institution in the law of evidence. To many it is one of those fundamental
tenets of fairness that marks our justice system.20 9  According to some
commentators, liberal introduction of propensity evidence in sex offense-cases
obliterates the right to a fair trial and bears the imprimatur of an inquisition.21 0
Courts applying the rules have acknowledged those concerns and dealt with
them largely by requiring a balancing of FRE 413-415 evidence under FRE
403 to determine if it is more probative than prejudicial.21  FRE 403's
balancing test necessarily leaves courts with great latitude to determine when
otherwise relevant evidence may unfairly harm the defendant. The
combination of fairness concerns, broad judicial discretion, and the new rules'
reliance on traditional stereotypes appears to have resulted in disparate
application in a manner that reflects the crazed rapist paradigm.
Jane Aiken's review of the new rules' application in civil actions for sexual
misconduct reveals that in cases involving paradigm stranger rape or child
molestation, courts tend to allow propensity evidence although they routinely
sustain FRE 403 objections in situations where the sexual misconduct involved
an adult female acquaintance.21 2 Cases decided since Aiken's article continue
assaults of adults and children but also to sexual harassment lawsuits.
209 See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 13-14 ("Th[e] ban on propensity evidence
has been firmly and historically established since at least the seventeenth century.... It is a
fundamental conception of how defendants should be tried in American courtrooms.");
Sheft, supra note 59, at 73 (describing ban on character evidence as an essential component
of American jurisprudence).
210 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 23-34 (arguing that FRE 413-415's admission
of propensity evidence violates the presumption of innocence protected by the due process
clause); Sheft, supra note 59, at 77-82 (declaring that the admission of propensity evidence
additionally violates the equal protection clause). The Judicial Conference Committee also
raised questions regarding the constitutionality of FRE 413-415. See 159 F.R.D. at 54
(arguing that the opposing party should have the right to offer rebuttal character evidence in
order to negate constitutional concerns).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-31 (10th Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging "serious constitutional due process issue" raised by rules but holding due
process satisfied by application of FRE 403 balancing); see also sources cited supra note 47
(identifying cases that have applied the balancing test).
212 See Jane Harris Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the
Propensity Rule, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 1221, 1244. For cases in which courts sustained FRE
403 objections, see United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (D.N.M. 1997), aff'd
135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (past accusations of sexual fondlings by physician
excluded under FRE 403 in pending case alleging similar fondling); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l
Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (evidence of sexual misconduct
arising after plaintiff's employment excluded under FRE 403 in pending sexual harassment
case); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 627 (D.N.J. 1996) (past allegation of
sexual assault excluded under FRE 403 in pending sexual harassment case); United States v.
Jackson, CR 95-388-FR, 1996 WL 444968, at *4 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (past allegations of
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that trend.2 13 None of the courts excluding propensity evidence in sexual
misconduct cases involving acquaintances explicitly bases its rejection of the
evidence on the crazed rapist stereotype. Rather, the reasons cited bear the
mark of neutral evidentiary policy. Thus, in some cases, the court found that
past evidence was too stale, 214 or that the past acts were sufficiently different
from the pending case to be non-probative and prejudicial.2 15 Given the
potentially inflammatory and prejudicial uses of propensity evidence, those
reasons seem perfectly legitimate. 21 6 The problem in these cases, however, lies
not in their use of such reasons, but that in using them they scrutinize far more
carefully cases involving acquaintances than they do child molestation or
stranger rape cases.
sexual assault excluded under FRE 403 as being insufficiently similar in pending sexual
assault case). For cases in which the court allowed admission of FRE 413-415 evidence
after a FRE 403 balancing, see United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1997)
(allowing evidence of child molestation occurring 16-20 years prior in pending molestation
case); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at *2 (N.D. I11. July 8,
1997) (acts of past sexual misconduct admissible in pending case alleging sexual contact
with minors).
213 Courts in cases involving child molestation and stranger rape almost uniformly allow
propensity evidence after a FRE 403 balancing. See United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d
1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing evidence of past molestation of children in pending
child molestation case); United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2000)
(allowing evidence of past forcible, child molestation in pending forcible child molestation
case); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 899 (10th Cir. 1999) (allowing evidence of
past molestation in pending molestation case); United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016
(8th Cir. 1998) (allowing prior evidence of 10-year-old conviction for carnal knowledge of a
child in pending molestation case); United States v. Peters, 133 F.3d 933 (table of
unpublished opinions), No. 96-2286, 1998 WL 17750, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 1998)
(allowing evidence of past convictions for forcible rape of a stranger in pending rape case).
Courts also remain unwilling to allow propensity evidence when the issue involved is
sexual misconduct with an acquaintance. See United States v. Acevedo, 117 F.3d 1429
(table of unpublished decisions), No. 96-2149, 1997 WL 392253, at *5 (10th Cir. July 14,
1997) (discussing district court's exclusion of evidence offered under FRE 413 of 18-year-
old conviction for attempted sexual assault in pending forcible sexual assault case of
acquaintance but allowing it as impeachment evidence on rebuttal); but see United States v.
Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1435 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing evidence of prior rape of an
acquaintance in pending acquaintance rape case).
214 See Acevedo, 1997 WL 392253, at *1 (discussing the district court's assertion that the
conviction was too remote in time to be admissible).
211 See Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 118-19 (arguing that the necessity of expert testimony to
determine the propriety of the defendant's past conduct, would lead to jury confusion);
Frank, 924 F. Supp. at 625-27 (arguing that the different factual scenario of the past act
decreased the probative value of the propensity evidence).
216 See Baker, supra note 10, at 573-74 (raising question of whether different types of
rape are probative of one another); id. at 590-97 (noting the potentially prejudicial and racist
effect of FRE 413-415).
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For example, in United States v. Guardia, a prosecution for criminal sexual
penetration, two women alleged that their physician inappropriately touched
them during a gynecological examination.217 The prosecution sought, pursuant
to FRE 413, to admit evidence from four other women who alleged similar
victimization by the defendant in order to show defendant had "'an on-going
disposition to commit sexual assaults against his female patients."'2 18 The
district court deemed the four prior incidents insufficiently similar to the issue
at hand and excluded the evidence under FRE 403.219 According to the court,
the allegations in the pending case-that defendant inappropriately touched
each victim's clitoris while commenting to the effect that he "loved" his job-
were qualitatively different from the earlier allegations, which involved claims
of inappropriate touching of the victims' breasts while claiming that he
"enjoyed" the experience and asking if the victim "was 'having fun."'' 220 Are
these allegations different? Unquestionably. But they are not qualitatively so.
Unwanted sexual touching of one's breasts and unwanted sexual touching of
one's clitoris are both unwanted sexual touching. The events are not so
different as to raise the specter of jury confusion and delay cited by the court as
reasons for excluding the evidence. 22 1
United States v. Jackson presents a similar issue. In Jackson, the defendant
allegedly raped the victim while she was unconscious.22 2 The defendant
claimed that the victim consented to intercourse. 223 To bolster the current
victim's testimony, the prosecution sought to admit evidence of a past sexual
assault in which police apprehended the defendant who was trying to have
intercourse with a half-clothed, intoxicated, teenage girl. 224 The court found
the prior incident to be insufficiently similar because the teenage victim "was
conscious and talking to [defendant] through most of the sexual act" unlike the
pending case in which the victim was unconscious. 225 Thus, the evidence was
217 See Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 117 (woman described defendant's behavior as "sexual
and inappropriate").
218 See id. at 119 (quoting government's response to defendant's motion to preclude
propensity evidence).
219 See id. at 118-20 (assessing the evidence and concluding that admitting it would result
in jury confusion, which would be unfair to the defendant).
220 Id. at 118.
221 See id. at 119 (arguing that the necessity of expert testimony for each incident would
confuse the jury); see also Aiken, supra note 212, at 1246-47 (discussing similarities in
allegations and implications of court's refusal to see them).
222 See United States v. Jackson, CR 95-388-FR, 1996 WL 444968, at *1 (D. Or. July 22,
1996) (victim alleged that when she awoke, defendant was having sexual intercourse with
her).
223 See id. (defendant contended that victim responded to him and made no effort to
rebuff him).
224 See id.
225 Id. at *4.
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not admissible under FRE 413.226 As in Guardia, there are differences in the
incidents. But the court's focus on the fact that the teenage victim was
"conscious and talking" ignored that (1) the police testified that she was so
incapacitated by alcohol that she had difficulty moving,227 (2) the assault on
the teenage victim began or continued while she was unconscious, 228 and (3)
that the teenage victim's "talking" during the incident consisted entirely of
voicing her protests to defendant's behavior. 229
If Guardia and Jackson are correct regarding the possible problems with the
admission of dissimilar evidence, one would expect courts similarly to
scrutinize propensity evidence in cases involving child molestation or stranger
rape allegations. Those cases reveal, however, that differences in allegations
are rarely obstacles to the admission of propensity evidence under FRE 413-
415. Thus, in United States v. McHorse,230 in which prosecutors charged the
defendant for the aggravated sexual abuse of his three nieces under the age of
twelve, the court allowed evidence of the past sexual abuse of two other young
children despite differences in the incidents. In the pending case, the
allegations of the three victims included substantial sexual fondling of the
victim's genitals, including allegations of forcible rape.231 In the two prior
incidents, however, the victim either could not describe the abuse or the
abusive act involved fondling outside of the victim's clothing.232 Nevertheless,
the court found the propensity evidence sufficiently similar to the charged
offenses as to be probative without being overly prejudicial.233 While one
could argue that the McHorse incidents are negligibly different and do not
warrant exclusion of the uncharged conduct evidence, the ease with which the
court admitted the evidence stands in marked contrast to Guardia and Jackson,
whose differences are no less inconsequential.
Some courts in child molestation cases are far more liberal in their
application of FRE 414 than was the McHorse court, admitting, for example,
evidence regarding vastly different charges. One court, for example, upheld
admission of a past statutory rape charge-apparently with a consenting minor
226 See id. at *4 (concluding that the evidence was not relevant to the case).
227 See id. at *2.
228 See id. at *3 (victim did not remember the assault).
229 See id. (victim stated that she told defendant that she did not want to have sex with
him).
230 See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 899 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence).
231 See id. at 894 (indictment alleged that defendant engaged in sexual acts with all three
victims).
232 See id. at 895 (victim stated that defendant made her touch him on the outside of his
clothing).
233 See id. at 898 (stating that the defendant's alleged conduct towards the victims
"closely resemble[d]" the conduct the propensity evidence described).
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who later became his wife-in a case involving forcible rape of a child. 234
Other courts allow admission of propensity evidence in child molestation cases
with no real substantive examination of the allegations to determine if they are
similar to those charged. 235  The mere fact that the evidence involves
molestation of a child appears to satisfy many courts as to the probative value
and admissibility of such evidence. 236
234 See United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, the court upheld the
admission of evidence of a past statutory rape conviction noting that the testimony of the
statutory rape victim, now the defendant's common-law wife, would provide the jury an
opportunity to discount the prejudice caused by the admission of the evidence); see also
United States v. Koruh, 210 F.3d 390 (table of unpublished decisions), No. 99-2138, 2000
WL 342252, at **l (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2000) (allowing admission of past forcible rape
allegation in pending case involving allegations of sexual fondling). In Koruh, the evidence
admitted was based on testimony of the defendant's daughter, from a previous marriage,
involving sexual abuse occurring more than 16 years before the present trial. See id. at **1.
Upholding the district court's decision to admit the evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard, the Tenth Circuit noted that the prosecutor had argued that the alleged
molestations were similar: both victims and the defendant's daughter were female and
related to the defendant; the girls were under the age of 12 years old when the alleged abuse
occurred; and the molestation allegedly occurred in or near the defendant's homes. See id.
at **4.
235 See, e.g., United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (2000) (upholding the
admission of testimony, in a forcible rape case, that defendant had forcibly raped his cousin
several years earlier). In Withron, there were similarities between the conduct on trial and
the past conduct-both cases involved forcible rape, the victims' ages were similar, and in
both cases the defendant claimed the victims had consented. See id. The court did not
address the similarities, but upheld admission of the evidence noting that there was a
"'strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be
admissible."' Id. (quoting United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997));
see also United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (in affirming a
conviction of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage
in sexual activity for which defendant could be charged with a crime, the court upheld
admission of evidence that defendant had abused his stepdaughters, more than thirty years
earlier, as evidence of defendant's intent to go on the trip to sexually molest the victim).
236 More than one court in child molestation cases has mentioned that past molestation
acts show defendant's aberrant sexual "taste" for children. See, e.g., United States v.
Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that propensity evidence in child
molestation cases is "exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of
defendant - a sexual or sado-sexual interest in children - that simply does not exist in
ordinary people"); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at *1, *3 (N.D.
I11. Jul. 8, 1997) (admitting evidence of other, contemporaneous but uncharged sexual
assaults under FRE 413, the court commented on defendant's "taste" for young girls, which
it argued tended to establish motive); United States v. Castillo, 188 F.3d 519 (table of
unpublished decisions), No. 98-2191, 1999 WL 569054, at **I (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (in
upholding admission of uncharged conduct under FRE 414 and 403, the court found
testimony relating to the uncharged conduct highly probative of the defendant's aberrant
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The disparate treatment of propensity evidence in child molestation and
stranger rape cases, on the one hand, and sexual misconduct cases involving
acquaintances, on the other, suggests that courts operate on a double standard.
This is not to say that courts should more liberally allow admission in
acquaintance misconduct cases; in fact, we rather like the general rule barring
use of propensity evidence. 237 But the pattern of decisions in FRE 413-415
cases suggests that the constitutional and philosophical questions raised by the
new rules, along with the "crazed" rapist stereotype that underlies them, drive
judges to treat differently those defendants who assault or harass
acquaintances.
That a similar pattern has arisen in states using the "lustful disposition"
exception further supports this conclusion. Courts. using this exception
routinely allow such evidence in child molestation cases, finding it useful to
"bolster the credibility of the prosecuting witness ... where the accusations or
the acts standing alone seem improbable or where the acts are crimes in
continuado in nature and it is highly probable similar acts have occurred before
or will occur after. ' 238 Far fewer jurisdictions extend the exception to rape
cases239 and some courts explicitly discriminate against acquaintance rape
victims, noting that rape of an adult woman is not "deviant behavior"240 and
that "the fact that one woman was raped is not substantial evidence that
another did not consent. '241
"sexual proclivities" towards his daughters).
237 See infra notes 299-307 and accompanying text for further discussion.
238 Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451 455 (Ind. App. 1986) ) (citing State v. Robbins, 46
N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1943)); see also Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 1987)
(holding that the depraved sexual act exception, allowing evidence of past sexual criminal
conduct in cases involving sodomy, sexual conduct against children, and incest, was not
applicable to rape of adult woman); State v. McFarlin, 517 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. 1973)
(upholding the admission of other acts of child molestation committed shortly before and
after the charged offense of child molesting, but noting that the lustful disposition exception
applied to cases of abnormal sexual conduct-such as sodomy, child molestation, and lewd
and lascivious conduct-and not to adult rape cases).
239 See Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 557-59 (finding that a survey of past acts
evidence in sex offense cases reveals that courts retaining the "lustful disposition" exception
increasingly limit it to child molestation cases); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited:
Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L.
127, 188 n.340 (1993) (noting that a survey of 29 states retaining the lustful disposition
exception reveals that a majority of cases where the exception was used involved child
molestation).
240 See Reichard, 510 N.E.2d at 165 (holding, in a case involving violent rape of woman
by her boyfriend, that evidence of prior rapes was inadmissible because they "did not
involve depraved sexual conduct") (citing Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. App. 1986));
see also Lehiy, 501 N.E.2d at 451, 456 (holding that "evidence of prior criminal sexual
conduct was not admissible to show depraved sexual instinct in a case where only rape was
being prosecuted").
241 McFarlin, 517 P.2d at 90 (citing Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (1948));
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Although courts may frequently have credible and legitimate reasons for
excluding FRE 413-415 evidence, the pattern arising in their decisions is
telling. As long as the defendant can be characterized as monstrous, courts are
able to overcome their traditional qualms regarding propensity evidence and
allow its use at trial. For men who do not fit that paradigm, however, courts go
to great lengths to ensure that such evidence is excluded, usually to the
detriment of sexual assault victim and successful prosecution. Although the
new rules' supporters hoped to further the feminist agenda regarding
acquaintance rape, the rules' acceptance of myths regarding men who rape
entirely undercut the agenda.
D. The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Action
VAWA's provision of a civil rights action for sexual assaults based upon
"gender animus" similarly reinforces the myth of the crazed rapist, although
VAWA's proponents never intended that result. VAWA's goals are clearly
feminist in nature. Indeed, VAWA's proponents characterize the Act's
primary aims as educating the public regarding the manner in which traditional
judicial mechanisms routinely ignored violence against women routinely and
providing women an avenue of redress for crimes that often went unpunished
at the state level.242 VAWA's legislative history is replete with congressional
findings and discussions of the many stereotypes preventing rape victims'
vindication, 243 which proponents hoped to eradicate with the new civil rights
accord State v. Valdez, 534 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). In Valdez, the court
noted that the two crimes had many similarities, including defendant's casual acquaintance
with the victims, the use of similar pretense for gaining access to the victims' homes, and
both rapes occurred in early morning hours and involved "a sexual tour-de-force including a
request for oral copulation." Id. at 452. Nevertheless, it held the prior act evidence
inadmissible under the common design, plan, scheme, and modus operandi exception,
noting that "[m]ere similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act is not
sufficient." Id. at 451-52; see also Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390-91 (9th Cir.
1948). In reversing the defendant's conviction in Lovely, the court refused to find that
similarities between the two acts-apparent casual acquaintance with the victim, taking the
victim in defendant's car to a remote location on a military installation, committing the rape
in the defendant's car, and claiming that the intercourse was consensual-established a plan
or scheme, concluding that "[tlhe fact that one woman was raped, however, has no tendency
to prove that another woman did not consent." Id. at 390.
242 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (detailing supporters' arguments in
favor of VAWA); see also Joseph R. Biden Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEG. 1, 4-5 (2000) (noting that Congress
had determined that state legal systems had "institutionalized" historic barriers against
women and had prevented equal protection of the law and further noting that state officials
had asked Congress to pass VAWA).
243 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39, 44-49 (1991) (discussing traditional rape myths and
related legal barriers to prosecution of rape); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38, 41-42, 44-47
(1993) (discussing the traditionally low prosecution rates for many crimes against women).
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action. Unfortunately, the civil rights action's "gender animus" requirement
undercuts its otherwise feminist grounding.
From its inception, VAWA's detractors raised concerns regarding the civil
rights remedy, the most significant of which condemned it for making "every
crime against a woman [a] civil rights violation. ' '244 The Conference of Chief
Justices opposed VAWA for a similar reason-because of its potential to
"cause major state-federal jurisdictional problems and disruptions in the
processing of domestic relations cases in state courts." 245 In an effort to quell
mounting opposition to his original bill, Senator Biden agreed to certain
compromises regarding its language. First, the civil rights action was limited
to certain violent acts amounting to felonies. 246 More importantly, the original
language of the bill allowing a civil rights action for crimes committed
244 Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 29 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Justice Department under President Bush opposed the civil
rights remedy arguing that "'whenever a woman is a victim of any crime, a case can be
made that the criminal preyed on her thinking she would be an easier target than a man."'
Nourse, supra, at 30 n.164 (quoting the Department of Justice's letter to Senator Biden,
Chairman Senate Judiciary Committee, 14 (Apr. 9, 1991) (on file with the Senate Judiciary
Committee)).
245 Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 80 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 House Hearing] (statement by the Conference of Chief Justices on S.15,
Violence Against Women Act of 1991).
The Supreme Court recently agreed, striking down the Civil Rights provision as beyond
Congress's power to regulate. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754-55,
1759 (2000) (striking down the VAWA's civil remedy provision as beyond Congress's
Commerce Clause regulatory powers and not within Congress's power under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment). While an examination of the gendered aspects of this
particular objection to VAWA is beyond the scope of this article, Professor Reva Siegel has
thoroughly set forth the relevant arguments. See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2196-2206 (1996) [hereinafter
Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love] (tracing the influence of traditional common law reasoning
with respect to gender and domestic relations on the federalism arguments about regulation
of domestic relations as raised by critics of VAWA's civil rights remedy).
246 See Nourse, supra note 244, at 28. In the original Act's version, the civil rights
remedy referred to a federal law that covered both felonies and misdemeanors. See id. The
compromise made clear that only felonies that potentially posed a threat of physical injury
could be the basis of such a claim. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (West 1995)
(identifying a "crime or violence" as an act that would constitute a felony if it presents
serious risk of injury, whether or not the act resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or
conviction). The compromise also extended coverage of the bill to those crimes that would
be felonies but for the relationship of the parties. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(2)(B) (West
1995) This second provision was inserted in recognition of those "cases in which state and
local laws effectively 'downgraded' a crime (to a misdemeanor) because of the relationship
of the parties." Nourse, supra note 244, at 28.
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"because of gender or on the basis of gender"247 was modified. The
compromise language required not only that crimes be "because of gender or
on the basis of gender" but also that they be "due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender. 2 48 The "animus" language was intended to
assuage concerns regarding the possibility that victims could bring civil rights
actions based solely upon the fact that a disparate number of victims were of a
single gender. The compromise version indicated that any action brought
under the civil rights provision required proof of a specific, gender-based
motive in that particular instance.249 Thus, the term "animus" was apparently
meant to indicate a requirement that the person committing the crime have
gender-bias as their "purpose" or "specific intent. '250 In this sense, the term
was used in a manner comparable to its use in other civil rights laws. 25'
Unfortunately, not everyone interpreted the term "animus" in this manner.
For example, Senator Hatch, who sponsored later versions of VAWA, argued
that the term "animus" was to be used more in the sense of "malice" or
"animosity." That is, women bringing such claims must show that their
247 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 28 (1991) (Section 3.01(c) and (d)(1) of proposed civil
rights claim).
248 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1398 1(d)(1) (West 1995).
249 This compromise reflected an "intermediate position" between those previously
advocated:
At one end of the spectrum was a "malice" or "animosity" standard. Such a standard
could have required proof that the defendant... hated all members of the opposite sex
or consciously intended to use violence as a message of gender hatred .... On the
other side of the spectrum was a "disparate impact" standard[,] under [which] statistical
evidence demonstrating the disparate impact of a particular kind of violence would
have been sufficient to make out a cause of action without regard to the particular
motivation or purpose of the defendant.
Nourse, supra note 244, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
250 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993). The Senate Report accompanying the final
version of VAWA indicated that the "new language elucidates the committee's intent that a
victim alleging a violation under this section must have been targeted on the basis of his or
her gender. The defendant must have had a specific intent or purpose, based on the victim's
gender, to injure the victim." Id.; see also Nourse, supra note 244, at 30-32 (discussing facts
supporting an interpretation of "animus" as "purpose" or "intent"); Goldscheid, supra note
65, at 150 (discussing legislative history and noting that Congress used the terms "animus,"
"purpose," and "motivation" interchangeably, thus dispelling any notion that disparate
impact would be sufficient for recovery).
251 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (creating a civil remedy for victims of
conspiracies to deprive them of equal protection of the laws). The Supreme Court, however,
has noted that § 1985(3)'s animus requirement does not require "maliciously motivated, as
opposed to assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination against
women." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993)
(holding that § 1985(3) does not create a federal cause of action against people who obstruct
women's access to abortion clinics and rejecting the argument that the abortion opponent's
opposition to abortion reflects an animus against women).
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attacker bore some kind of hatred or ill-will toward them:
We're not opening the federal doors to all gender-motivated crimes. Say
you have a man who believes a woman is attractive. He feels encouraged
by her and he's so motivated by that encouragement that he rips her
clothes off and has sex with her against her will. Now let's say you have
another man who grabs a woman off some lonely road and in the process
of raping her says words like, "You're wearing a skirt! You're a woman!
I hate women! I'm going to show you, you woman!" Now the first one's
terrible. But the other's much worse. If a man rapes a woman while
telling her he loves her, that's a far cry from saying he hates her. A lust
factor does not spring from animus. 252
Senator Hatch's example thus highlights the enduring distinction between
"real" rape involving a frenzied and unbalanced stranger and other, "less
harmful," rape involving acquaintances. Moreover, his equation of the term
"animus" with "animosity" is not illogical given modem tendencies to conflate
the term.253 One can consequently see how the civil rights action's language
might encourage courts to continue distinguishing between "real" and "not-
real" rape.
Prior to the Supreme Court finding VAWA unconstitutional, at least one
court apparently made such a distinction. In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
and State University,254 the district court raised the issue of whether the rape
giving rise to the victim's civil rights claim qualified under the Act. According
to the complaint, two men whom the victim met "less than a half-hour earlier
and whose identities she knew only by given names and by their status as
football team members" repeatedly raped the victim in a university dorm
room.255 The rape was clearly effected by force-the defendants pinned down
252 Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12, 14 (quoting
Senator Orrin Hatch).
253 Nourse, supra note 244, at 32 n. 173. Some courts applying VAWA have commented
upon the ambiguity of the term "animus." See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1406 (N.D.
Iowa 1997) (commenting that the term "animus" was ambiguous but concluding, upon
reviewing VAWA's legislative history, that allegations of unwanted or unwelcomed sexual
advances are sufficient to meet the requirement that the victim allege that the defendant
targeted the victim due to his or her gender), rev'd in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1340
(8th Cir. 1998); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 474 (D.R.I. 1999) (analyzing the
ambiguity of the term "animus," the court reviewed VAWA's legislative history and
concluded that the existence of gender-motivated animus was determined by a totality of the
circumstances).
254 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that VAWA was within Congress's Commerce Clause powers), vacated en banc 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that VAWA could not be upheld under Congress's Commerce
Clause powers and was not a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
255 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
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the victim-and the defendants admitted that she did not consent. 256 On these
facts, the judge was satisfied that the victim raised a claim based on "gender
animus. ' '257 The court made clear, however, that not all rapes would support
such a claim:
All rapes are not the same, and the characteristics of the rapes here
alleged, when compared to other rapes, indicated that gender animus
more likely played a part in these rapes than in some other types of rapes.
First the assault involved a gang rape. While any rape is egregious, all
other factors the same, gang rape generally is more egregious than one-
on-one rape .... Second, these rapes fall somewhere in between stranger
rape and date rape, and are probably closer to stranger rape. Again, while
any rape is egregious, stranger rape and rapes such as the one in question
generally are more egregious than date rape. 258
To be sure, not all courts fell into this trap.259 Nonetheless, the fact that
some courts are willing to read the animus requirement as limiting the civil
rights claim to only paradigmatic stranger or gang rape indicates the potential
to reinforce, and perpetuate, the old stereotypes.2 60
256 See id. (noting that at the university's disciplinary hearing, the defendant, Morrison,
admitted that the victim said "no" twice in response to his requests for sexual intercourse).
257 See id. at 784. Although the Brzonkala court found that the particular facts of the
rape indicated gender animus, it discussed two statements by defendant Morrison that
reinforced the court's finding of gender animus. First, after having intercourse with the
victim, Morrison had stated, "You better not have any fucking diseases," which the court
said evidenced Morrison's disrespect for the victim. See id. The court said that more
relevant to gender animus was Morrison's statement at a later date, and made in the
presence of at least one woman, that he "like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of
them." Id. The court found that this later statement indicated a disrespect for women in
general and connected this gender disrespect to sexual intercourse. See id.
258 Id. at 784-85.
259 See, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540-41 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting
Brzonkala's "broad characterizations" of rape and noting that "[a]lthough Congress clearly
did not intend to designate rape as a per se 'crime of violence motived by gender,' the cases
where it is not would appear to this Court to be few and far between"); McCann v. Rosquist,
998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (D. Utah 1998) ("The notion that nonconsensual sexually oriented
conduct is actually amorous and therefore not invidiously discriminatory toward the
victimized class is clearly wrong."); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1408 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (finding allegations of unwanted or unwelcome sexual advances sufficient to satisfy
VAWA's "gender-motivated" requirement while rejecting notion that an "unwanted kiss
[was] merely a 'signal of affection').
260 Although no court has expressed its views on rape hierarchies as graphically as in
Brzonkala, some courts' discussions of the gender animus requirement further suggest that it
might lend itself to stereotypes. See Mattison v. Click Corp. of Amer., Inc., No. 97-CV-
2736, 1998 WL 32597, at * 1-'2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998). Mattison involved allegations by
a female plaintiff that her male supervisor made repeated requests for sexual favors, verbally
abused her by calling her degrading names, coerced her into a sexual relationship, and
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The civil rights action might have been primed for such misuse even absent
the term "animus." Although lacking the "animus" language, even the original
versions of the civil rights action required a specific motive. The legislative
history supporting the "because of gender or on the basis of gender" language
emphasized that "[d]iscriminatory motivation is clearly required ... and...
the plaintiff must prove that the crime of violence-whether an assault, a
kidnapping, or a rape-was motivated by gender."261 Moreover, the legislative
history further emphasized that the civil rights action was intended to redress
crimes of gender-bias in much the same way that current bias crimes
legislation protected other categories of people. 262  In fact, Congress
specifically noted that "[g]enerally accepted guidelines for identifying hate
crimes may also be useful" in giving content to the gender-motivation
requirement. 263
Unfortunately, by basing VAWA's civil rights action on the paradigm used
in bias/discrimination cases, its supporters subtly reinforced old stereotypes
regarding rape. Although such remedies, like VAWA, do not require
animosity as a motivating factor,264 that emotion is commonly the underlying
ultimately forcibly raped her. See id. The court dismissed the defendant's claim that his
actions and remarks "demonstrate[d] an affinity, not animosity towards women," including
plaintiff. Id. at *7. The court did not rule, however, that the defense of "amorousness" was
never available. Instead, it ruled simply that the detailed allegations of humiliating and
degrading behavior in this case "overshadowed" defendant's claims and "connect[ed his]
gender disrespect to sexual intercourse." Id. (citation omitted). The court in Liu v. Striuli,
36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999), similarly relied upon extrinsic evidence, such as lewd
comments, threats of deportation and the lack of any other apparent motive, to bolster the
conclusion that defendant's conduct toward a female victim, which included forcible rape,
was gender-motivated. See id. at 475-76. While neither court necessarily meant to
distinguish between types of rape, their desire to bolster what were obviously forcible
acquaintance rapes with additional allegations of behavior showing a hostile or demeaning
attitude toward women suggests that rape stereotypes operate even in these cases.
261 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 (1991).
262 See id. at 50 (discussing the similarities between proof of gender motivation and the
proscribed motivation in other civil rights laws).
263 Id. at 50 n.72.
264 The Anti-Defamation League's model hate crime law, which many states have
followed, defines a hate crime as a crime committed "'by reason of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of
individuals."' Katherine Chen, Note, Including Gender in Bias Crime Statutes: Feminist
and Evolutionary Perspectives, Note, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 287-88 (1997)
(quoting Anti-Defamation League of the B'Nai B'Rith, ADL Hate Crime Statutes: A
Response to Anti-Semitism, Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry at A-I (Supp. 1990)).
Similarly, the federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act defines a bias crime as one which
"manifest[s] evidence of prejudice based on" various classifications. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 534
note (West 1993) (Hate Crime Statistics). Like § 1985(3), see supra note 234, neither of
these requires animosity in order to manifest bias. A defendant could, for example, act
against a victim not because of overt animosity so much as complete indifference to the
20011
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impetus for a defendant's conduct in such cases.265 Framing the cause of
action in terms of gender-bias and likening it to civil rights violations or bias
crimes against minorities thus "depends in part on an assumption that gender
bias will manifest itself as race discrimination manifests itself: in an emotional
state called 'hate.' ' 266 Such an assumption ignores the complexity of men's
motives for rape. As Katharine Baker has noted, some men rape because they
hate women but many others do so for vastly different reasons-to bond with
other men, because they view women as commodities to possess, or because
they desire sex and are simply indifferent to women's objections. 267 These
latter motives are far more likely to underlie what we think of as acquaintance
rape. As a consequence, the bias paradigm may encourage the legal system
and the public to make the same distinctions that the Brzonkala court made. 268
humanity of that person or group.
265 Most working definitions of bias crimes, for example, recognize that such crimes
actually are committed out of animosity toward an individual because of their membership
in a particular class. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women:
Gender & the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157, 159 (1994) ("The
term 'hate crime' generally refers to a crime committed ... out of hostility toward the group
to which the victim belongs."); Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating Male Violence Against
Women As a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 577 (1996) ("Bias crime offenders typically
act against individuals they perceive to be members of a particular group toward which the
offenders feel animosity.").
266 Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245, at 2205.
267 See Baker, supra note 10, at 599 (motivated by desire for sex); id. at 602 (ignoring
women's boundaries); id. at 603 (treating women as sexual commodities); id. at 606
(bonding with other men).
268 A number of authors argue in favor of the bias crimes paradigm, either through
VAWA or state bias crime laws. See Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A
Promising Tool For Fighting Violence Against Women, 2 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 63, 100-03
(1994) (arguing that the potential benefits of treating violence against woman as hate crimes
include: providing remedies that are not traditionally available to women; increasing public
awareness of the seriousness and prevalence of violence against women; and directing the
emphasis away from the sexual nature of certain biased-motivated violent crimes against
woman, such as rape, which perpetuate the existing "rape myths"); Steven Bennett
Weisbrud & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 33-40 (1994) (articulating reasons why gender-related crimes fit
the bias crime mold); Taylor, supra note 265, at 594-604 (concluding that male violence
against women is gender-motivated and is similar, in many respects, to bias crimes
motivated by race, religion, or sexual orientation); Chen, supra note 264, at 288-324
(arguing that both feminist and evolutionary theories support inclusion of gender in bias
crime statutes); W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights For
Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 603-15 (1993) (arguing that much violence against
women contains the bias factors common to other bias crimes).
Some authors even argue that acquaintance rape should be included within the confines of
bias crimes and mount feminist arguments regarding the bias aspects of acquaintance rape.
See, e.g., Weisbrud & Levin, supra at 40-41 ("No matter what the particular facts of a given
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If a man does not use excessive violence, is not a stranger or working in a
group, and does not seem mentally unbalanced or socially unattractive, he will
be less likely to be thought of as acting out of "hatred" rather than some other,
more excusable motive. Moreover, VAWA's proponents further exacerbated
the potential perpetuation of these rape myths by using a scenario in which a
serial rapist hurls misogynistic slurs while committing the rape as their primary
example of a gender-motivated rape.2 69 Although the drafters did not intend
for this to be the only example of a bias crime, their use of it as a paradigmatic
one has in turn caused courts to rely heavily on that paradigm for guidance
when discussing gender animus.210
Finally, VAWA's proponents' admission that some rapes are not motivated
by gender is especially corrosive to the feminist critique of rape. While
different motives for why men rape women do in fact exist, all motives
essentially depend upon women's subordinate status and a disregard for female
humanity. In Lynne Henderson's words "rlape denies that you are a person,
that you exist .... When a woman's existence just does not matter, intercourse
becomes rape."'27 1 To suggest that something other than gender or gender-
case, there is no escaping the fact that rapes are committed against women as women.");
Chen, supra note 264, at 320 (arguing that there is no significant difference between
stranger and non stranger rape, that both types of rape have the same underlying motivation,
and that "all males benefit from the rape of females because it strongly discourages females
from deviating from male control, thereby ensuring paternity"); Hallock, supra, at 609-10
(arguing that rape should be seen as a "per se act of gender violence" and that once rape is
proven, a "rebuttable presumption of gender bias should arise"). We agree that courts
should interpret bias crimes as including acquaintance rape. Our fear, however, is that they
will not do so because their focus on hate conjures up images of the crazed rapist that
detract from feminist arguments regarding acquaintance rape.
269 The Senate Report's unfortunate example of a gender-motivated rape stated:
Consider the case of a serial rapist who violates his victims as he hurls misogynist
slurs. The victim's lawyers would prove exactly the same type of "circumstances" that
the lawyer in the "race" case proved: that the victim was of one sex (female) and the
attacker a different sex (male); that the attacker did not kidnap and rape men, but had a
long history of attacking women; and that the attacker shouted anti-woman epithets
during the assault. Again, the jury might not be convinced by any one of these
circumstances individually-but all together show gender bias.
S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991).
270 See supra notes 254-58, 260.
271 Lynne Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 226
(1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)). Catharine MacKinnon makes a
stronger version of this argument:
Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random,
but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender ....
Rape is an act of dominance over women that works systematically to maintain a
gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvantaged status as the
appropriate victims and targets of sexual aggression.
Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301-
02 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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hierarchies is at the root of rape not only opens the door to patriarchal
arguments that rape is about a man's psychosis, it ultimately undercuts the
feminist agenda.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FEMINIST RESPONSETO THE NEW LEGISLATION
AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. The Feminist Response to the New Legislation and Its Implications
Despite the problems it poses for the feminist agenda, few feminists have
spoken out against the new legislation. Of those critics, particularly
noteworthy are Katharine Baker and Aviva Orenstein, who have criticized FRE
413-415 as "displaying attitudes and assumptions that betray basic anti-
feminist biases." 272 Likewise, a handful of scholars have criticized VAWA's
anti-feminist assumptions and potential bias against acquaintance rape.273 In
contrast, feminists have been essentially silent regarding notification and civil
commitment statutes, with the bulk of scholarship on those laws involving
constitutional or criminological critiques rather than feminist analysis. 274
Several factors could account for feminists' lack of response to these laws.
272 Orenstein, supra note 9, at 691; see also Baker, supra note 10, at 589 (noting that
"Rule 413 and its supporting rationale fail to acknowledge, much less incorporate, most of
what scholars have learned about rape in the past twenty-five years").
273 See Jennifer Gafney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a
Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247, 256-57
(1997) (arguing that the bias crime model might preclude actions for marital rape under
VAWA's civil rights action because of refusal to see marital rape as motivated by hate); see
also Wendy Rae Willis, Note, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of
the Violence Against Women Act, Note, 80 GEo L.J. 2197, 2212 (1992) (suggesting that
requiring proof of improper motivation-i.e. hate or animus toward women-as required in
racial violence cases, ignores the unique nature of the sexual violence injury and arguing
that the rape itself should raise a credible presumption that the assault was gender
motivated).
274 Stephen Schulhofer and Lenore Simon note that civil commitment and notification
statutes presume that the defendant was a stranger to his victim. Neither, however,
discusses the issue primarily from a feminist perspective. The former merely mentions the
issue in passing while writing from a constitutional perspective and the latter writes from a
therapeutic jurisprudence rationale. See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 76
(noting that sexually violent predator laws are targeted at acts committed by strangers, thus
ignoring other crimes that constitute a large part of the sexual violence problem-domestic
violence, child abuse by family members, and other acquaintance abuse); Lenore M.J.
Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIz. L.
REV. 485, 490, 496 (1999) (arguing that the fact that fear of stranger-committed violence
fuels most criminal legislation, including sex offender laws, creates a misperception of the
magnitude of sexually violent crimes, and promotes inadequate solutions for the majority of
sexually violent crimes against children and women, which are carried out by
acquaintances).
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First, all of these new laws try to strengthen the conviction and/or punishment
of men who rape. Accordingly, feminists may be reluctant to criticize these
legislative efforts that, at least superficially, give them what they have
demanded for years-that the legal system take rape seriously. This is
especially true when one considers that feminists who make nuanced
arguments regarding particularly difficult legal issues are often accused of
being fickle or hypocritical. 275 Rather than put rape reform efforts at risk,
some may see silence as a better option.
Second, with respect to notification and sexual predator statutes in
particular, it is possible that such laws simply are not on feminists' radar
screens. Because the laws apply only to offenders already convicted of rape,
some feminists may see them as tangential to their principal agenda, which
generally seeks to broaden substantive definitions and legal recognition of
rape. While we believe that these laws have a substantive impact on the
feminist rape agenda, it is certainly understandable that others, at least at first
glance, do not view them in that manner.
Finally, some feminists may not have spoken out against the new legislation
because they support it. As alluded to above, one can stake out credible
feminist positions in support of such laws.276 VAWA provides the most
obvious example in this regard. The legislative history reveals obvious
feminist reasoning behind the civil rights action,277 and many feminist
scholars278 and activists 279 strongly supported it. Although we disagree with
supporters of VAWA regarding its impact on the feminist agenda, we do not
dispute that they make legitimate feminist arguments in favor of the law.
Despite arguments in favor of the new legislation, we believe that the
feminist agenda with respect to rape-i.e., the desire to broaden societal and
legal understanding of rape beyond stereotypical stranger rape-is best served
if feminist scholars and activists oppose the new laws. First, by perpetuating
the myth of the crazed rapist, the new legislation's lasting anti-feminist effects
outweigh other, potential feminist aspects of the law. Feminist reform efforts
275 See Christina E. Wells, Hypocrites and Barking Harlots, The Clinton-Lewinsky Affair
and the Attack on Women, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 151, 153-54 & n.10 (1998)
(countering the hypocrisy charges made by anti-feminist commentators against women's
continued support of President Clinton following revelations of his affair with Monica
Lewinsky and the subsequent investigation and impeachment).
276 See id. at 153-54.
277 See supra notes 69-72, 243 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 124 (characterizing the civil rights action as
embodying a feminist position that rape is a bias crime); Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love,
supra note 245, at 2206 (arguing that the "very struggle over the interpretation of VAWA's
civil rights remedy will, of necessity, modernize gender status discourse").
279 Many feminists responded with protests to the Supreme Court's decision striking
down VAWA. See Sarah Cagle, Tech Protest Targets High Court Ruling, ROANOKE TIMES
& WORLD NEWS, May 26, 2000, available in 2000 WL 5267991 (discussing organized
protest of Court's decision in Virginia and Washington D.C.).
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initially sprang from the recognition that, although the law formally took rape
seriously, myths and prejudicial attitudes impeded adequate prosecution of the
crime. 280 Researchers Ronald Berger, Patricia Searles, and Lawrence Neuman
found further that feminist rape reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s failed
partly because many reforms "preserved significant features of the pre-reform
legislation. '281 It thus matters a great deal whether the statutes in question
embrace traditional stereotypes. As with past laws, the new legislation's clear
grounding in stereotypes is likely to undercut its potentially beneficial aspects.
Second, allowing the legislature to devote significant time and attention to
laws embracing the crazed rapist myth may impede future feminist efforts to
reshape rape legislation. The scale of the new laws suggests that they
consumed enormous amounts of legislative resources and time, both of which
are in short supply. Legislatures may balk at spending additional time on new,
alternative approaches when they believe that they have already dealt with the
problem adequately. Thus, feminists must educate the legislature regarding the
problems with the laws in order to persuade them that future initiatives are yet
appropriate. 2 2
Third, as other, similar rape-related initiatives threaten to proliferate, 28 3
feminists risk a backlash against their agenda. There exist serious
constitutional and philosophical questions with respect to many of the new
laws.284 History demonstrates that just one very public case of a seemingly
"normal" man falling victim to the feminist cause is all that is necessary for the
280 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which rape
myths decreased successful prosecution of rape).
281 See Berger, et al., supra note 103, at 335-36.
282 We recognize that in the case of the existing legislation our argument can be
characterized as shutting the barn door after the animals have escaped. Ideally, feminists
should speak out against such legislation before the legislature expends time and energy
enacting it. However, educating legislatures regarding the flaws in the new laws still
performs a useful function because it may make them less complacent and more willing to
listen to future proposals. Moreover, some feminists did oppose the new laws prior to their
enactment which suggests that an on-going educational effort is still necessary.
283 The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed a bill requiring that colleges enact
policies regarding registration and notification of sexually violent predators (as defined in
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program) who are enrolled at or employed by that institution. See H.R. 4504, 106th Cong.,
2nd Sess. § 2(i)(7)(A) (2000) (discussing how the institution "shall make available to the
campus community ... all such information [provided to the institution by the State,
pursuant to § 170101 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42
U.S.C. 14071)] concerning" any such person enrolled or employed at the institution, how to
access the information, the frequency of updates of the information, and the type of
information available.).
284 See supra notes 160-65 (discussing constitutional issues raised by
registration/notification statutes); see also supra note 183 (discussing constitutional issues
raised by civil commitment statutes).
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resulting blame to be laid at feminism's door.285 Feminists have struggled in
the last decade to control their image in the face of accusations that they are
authoritarian, "man-hating" "femi-nazis. ''286 Feminist failure to criticize the
new statutes and attribution of these laws' existence to feminist politics,
exacerbates those accusations and further undermines feminist efforts to
expand the public's understanding of rape.
Finally, sociobiological theories attempting to debunk the crazed rapist myth
and portray rape as a natural, biological byproduct are gaining popularity,2 87
suggesting that a focus on men and why they rape will be an enduring aspect of
future discussions. Feminist failure both to speak out against the new
legislation and to engage in a broader and more public discussion regarding
rape motives and their relationship to biological, psychological, and cultural
factors, may allow sociobiological theories to co-opt rape discourse. This
might well result in the substitution of the crazed rapist stereotype with a
different but similarly invidious notion that rape is inevitable and normal.288
285 Some scholars already imply such blame. One commentator, while never explicitly
blaming feminists for the Federal Rules of Evidence, nevertheless strongly intimates that
they are at fault for what he perceives to be fundamentally unfair treatment of rape
defendants. He thus argues that FRE 413-415 reflect the political trends of the time, rather
than careful and proper legislative efforts and claims that the trends reflect women's
growing political influence as a result of increased debates regarding women in the
military/workplace, and dramatically increasing rape statistics. See Ellis, supra note 59, at
973-74.
286 See Linda J. Lacey, We Have Nothing to Fear But Gender Stereotypes: Of Katie and
Amy and "Babe Feminism," 80 CORNELL L. REV. 612, 640 (1995) (reviewing KATIE
ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)) (commenting
on feminists' pervasive stereotype being that of a feminazi, as compared to the view of
women generally as passive and cowering Victorian victim). Some of this criticism comes
not only from right wing critics such as Rush Limbaugh, but from neo-feminists who argue
that feminists focusing on date rape "'betray[] feminism' by portraying women as fragile,
vulnerable, and unable to negotiate the 'libidinous jostle,' of contemporary life without
paternalistic rules and restrictions." Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience:
Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534 (1994) (quoting Katie
Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 1993, at 26, and discussing
Camille Paglia's and Roiphe's criticism of feminists who they believe exaggerate date rape
claims).
287 See, e.g., RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE:
BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 84 (2000) ("[T]he proximate causes of human
rape lie in the different adaptations of male and female sexuality that were formed by
selection in human evolutionary history."); see also Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the
Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827, 831-32
(1999) (asserting that rape discourse should involve both biological and social theories and
perspectives); id. at 899 (suggesting that "a partnership between life sciences and social
sciences is necessary to construct an adequate model of rape behavior").
288 Evolutionary biologists do not all believe that rape is inevitable and thus beyond the
reach of the law because of its biological bases. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 287, at 909-17
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B. Possible Prescriptions Regarding the New Legislation
As discussed more fully below, we believe that the feminist agenda is best
served by repeal of most of the new rape initiatives. Repeal, however, may be
neither necessary nor possible. Recognizing this fact, this section briefly
discusses possible approaches to each law that wholly or partly satisfy our
concerns regarding the crazed rapist myth and that also promote legitimate
feminist and other goals underlying the legislation.
1. Registration and Notification Laws
In our estimation, lawmakers should repeal registration and notification
laws. Aside from our criticism, numerous commentators persuasively posit the
laws' shortcomings, ranging from their ineffectiveness 289 and their tendency to
(discussing how, although biological influences contribute to rape patterns and incidence, it
"does not automatically follow" that rape is inevitable or that rape should be tolerated).
Rather, they simply seek to give rape biological origins. See id. at 838-53 (discussing
theories of biological influences on rape, including natural selection theory, sexual selection
theory, and the evolution of species-typical human behavior). Some scholars do argue that
rape's potential biological origin excuses much of that behavior. See, e.g., RICHARD
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 107, 384-85 (1992) (generally discussing rape as "primarily a
substitute for consensual sexual intercourse" rather than as misogyny or attempts to
subordinate women). The danger in allowing the evolutionary biology debate to occur
without feminist input regarding why men rape on a social level is that the "biology as
inevitability" argument will take hold, much like the crazed rapist stereotype did, to excuse
men's actions rather than to try to understand them. See Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is
and What It Ought Not to Be, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 233, 240 (1999) (noting that "[i]f law is to
combat rape effectively, it must attempt to change the social meaning of rape," and that the
goal should be to understand how rape exists and operates on both biological and
sociological levels); id. at 238-39 (noting that social constructions encourage rape); see also
Robin West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2438-40 (1993)
(reviewing POSNER, supra) (discussing how Posner's arguments suggest that patriarchy has
biological roots, that it is rooted in human nature and that the theory of sociobiology favors
the sexual status quo); id. at 2444-46 (under Posner's analysis, patriarchy, rape, and other
acts which subordinate women, are not practices of subordination per se, but rather efficient
practices, "successful adaptations to biological market conditions for efficient evolutionary
strategies").
289 See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 44, at 20-22 (noting that notification is often too
vague to be useful and causes needless paranoia among the public); Jessica R. Ball,
Comment, Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame:" Child Sex Offender Community
Notification in Illinois, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 401,. 439 (1996) (noting that 40% of offenders
in Washington and 75% in California have failed to register); id. at 440 ("Rather than
furthering a state's goal of preventing future sex offenses, community notification serves
only as a reactive measure reflecting the community's outrage over the proliferation of sex
crimes against children."), Montana, supra note 157, at 584-85 (discussing generally the
difficulty criminal offenders have in reassimilating to the community, and that notification
laws reinforce the stigmas they face and interfere with reassimilation attempts).
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cause vigilantism, 290 to their significant stigmatic and liberty-depriving
effects. 291 Our feminist critique highlights yet another defect in such laws and
further suggests that the overwhelming evidence argues against them.
Moreover, the laws are fundamentally inconsistent with a feminist approach to
personhood. Feminist critiques of the legal and social treatment of women
largely center on demanding recognition of female personhood. Laws which
expose male offenders to extreme stigmatization, violence, and deprivation of
fundamental personal liberties essentially ignore their personhood and are
inconsistent with a feminist recognition of human dignity. As Deborah Rhode
has noted "[a]ny ethical framework adequate to challenge gender subordination
must similarly condemn the other patterns of injustice with which it
intersects. '292 This is not to say that sex offenders should go unpunished or
should be free from all stigmatization. The appropriate way to meet punitive
and protective goals, however, is through legitimate penalogical methods, such
as longer prison sentences, rather than manipulation of constitutional
boundaries.
In light of registration and notification statutes' popularity, their repeal in
the near future is unlikely. Given this fact, legislatures should at least calibrate
notification laws to aim at a real problem rather than a stereotype. Instead of
relying on broad notions that rapists recidivate, legislatures should identify
concrete and particular characteristics that make offenders or classes of
offenders more likely to recidivate. 293 For example, there is some evidence
that men who molest children may recidivate more often and in different ways
than other sex offenders. 294 If true, legislatures could limit notification laws
290 See sources cited supra notes 160, 163.
291 See sources cited supra note 162.
292 Deborah Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Challenges and Cultural Change, 100
YALE L.J. 1731, 1736 (1991). In the specific context of rape, Aviva Orenstein has noted:
Sometimes, particularly in... rape cases ... there will be a conflict between empathy
for the accused (particularly when he comes from an oppressed minority) and practical
concern for what is good for women. Often, however,. .. this is a false dilemma.
Once the problem is analyzed enlightened concern for women's safety recognizes that
women are not safer or better off in a world that treats those accused of crimes-even
the crime of rape-unfairly.
Orenstein, supra note 9, at 690-91 n. 113.
293 Legislatures likely would need to rely more heavily on psychological and mental
health literature in order to identify which aspects of crime and the offender are adequate
predictors of recidivism.
294 Sentiments seem to be mixed regarding this proposition. Some studies suggest a
compulsive-like form of recidivism and that child molestors are particularly difficult to
rehabilitate. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 795 (discussing studies by legislators
when "Megan's Law" and "Zachary's Law" were being considered including one finding
74% of imprisoned child sex offenders had a previous conviction for a similar offense and
that they were the most difficult class of criminals to rehabilitate and another claiming that
the average child sex offender molested 117 children during his lifetime). Others indicate
that child molesters do not specialize or recidivate at higher rates than other criminals. See
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only to such offenders. Although such a limitation may not eradicate
generalized notions of the registered offender as monstrous, it aims at men who
pose a concrete and identifiable harm, thus minimizing unwarranted
stigmatization. It also does not encourage courts to manipulate the laws to
avoid stigmatizing "normal" men and is thus less likely to undercut the
feminist agenda.
2. Sexual Predator Laws
Like registration and notification laws, legislatures should repeal sexual
predator laws. As numerous scholars maintain, the laws' reliance on
questionable mental illness diagnoses treads upon constitutional rights295 and
has significant stigmatic effects. 296  A state desiring to detain perceived
dangerous offenders should do so through the criminal justice system by
seeking longer sentences. Moreover, states may detain truly mentally ill
offenders who pose a danger to the public through existing civil commitment
statutes. Either alternative avoids creating the impression that sex offenders as
a class are mentally ill and, in turn, does not reinforce the myth of the crazed
rapist.
If repeal is not politically feasible,297 amendments to existing laws may
avoid reinforcing the crazed rapist myth. First, the limitation in certain statutes
to offenders who victimize strangers must be repealed. Second, the legal
Lenore M.J. Simon, The Myth Of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387 (1997) (noting that "[flew 'rapists' or 'child
molesters' specialize in rape and child molestation"); id. at 401 (stating that "there is no
evidence that child molesters... have higher recidivism rates or are in fact more dangerous
than other types of offenders" and claiming that "it is impossible to predict which [convicted
child molesters] will remolest" a child victim). We do not advocate that legislatures enact
laws limited to child molestation but use this information only as an example of a possible
way to limit notification statutes.
295 See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
296 See, e.g., Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 189, at 191-92 (noting that
"[s]ince sex offender commitments are held out as being applicable only to the 'most
dangerous criminals,' the stigma from sex offender commitments is arguably much worse
than that of a criminal prosecution") (footnotes omitted); id. at 192 (noting that the language
of sex offender discourse is "objectifying and demeaning"). Other commentators note that
labeling sex offenders as mentally abnormal, and as "violent sexual predators," may
"reinforce their antisocial sexual behavior" and ultimately "get in the way of change and
provide [sex offenders] with an excuse for giving in to their sexual urges." Winick, supra
note 131, at 539.
297 Sexual predator laws do not enjoy the popularity of registration and notification laws
which exist in every state. In fact, twenty-one states have rejected bills proposing such
statutes. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 87-88 (noting that although sexual
predator laws have been rejected or withdrawn in 21 states, and that there has always been
opposition to the laws, for example, from civil liberties lawyers and some psychiatrists, they
have generally proved easy to pass). However, the statutes are politically popular in the
states that have them, suggesting that they will not soon be repealed.
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system's involvement in commitment proceedings should come only after an
initial evaluation by a qualified mental health professional based on
personalized criteria relevant to assessing each offender's likelihood of
recidivism. 298  In this way, mental health personnel rather than law
enforcement officials determine which candidates genuinely require
commitment. Statutes that are willing to brand some sex offenders as mentally
abnormal may somewhat reinforce the myth of the crazed rapist, but, as with
the notification statutes, the use of particularized criteria by qualified
professionals aims at a concrete problem, and is more likely to avoid
unwarranted stigmatization and determinations based on stereotypes.
3. Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
Congress should also repeal FRE 413-415. In addition to our concern that
such rules are applied in a manner almost uniformly ignoring the problem of
acquaintance rape, scholars also argue that the new rules will likely be applied
in a racially discriminatory manner or in a manner disparately affecting men
already within the criminal justice system.299 They further note that the rules
unfairly "prejudice[] the accused by offering up someone who has already been
branded as a member of [a] small antisocial set. '300 Such stigmatization not
only amounts to inhumane treatment of an accused, 30 1 but departs substantially
from past court practice and notions of fundamental fairness associated with
evidence law. 30 2 Moreover, much relevant evidence of past crimes is already
admissible under FRE 404(b)'s exceptions to the character evidence ban,
particularly when used to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Past bad acts evidence
in rape cases may be especially useful to show a defendant's motive or absence
of mistake.30 3
Using FRE 404(b) is not a perfect approach. Admission under one of the
exceptions may still stigmatize an offender unreasonably and predispose the
jury to convict.3° One can also argue that judges will simply apply FRE 404's
299 Some states already require an initial evaluation by a mental health professional. See
supra note 37.
299 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 594-97 (noting that black men receive more severe
penalties for rape than white men and that the legal system also discriminates against black
women).
300 Orenstein, supra note 9, at 693.
301 See id.
302 See sources cited supra notes 209-10.
303 See Baker, supra note 10, at 612 (noting that various "motivational typologies" allow
courts to admit evidence of prior acts of rape under FRE 404(b), without needing 413); id. at
613 (discussing the motive exception at length, and arguing that courts should also rely on
the absence of mistake exception in 404(b)).
31 See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 696 ("Although Baker's solution avoids some of the
anti-feminist assumptions of Rule 413, it still replicates many of its evils in demonizing
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exceptions in a manner similar to their application of FRE 413-415-i.e., in a
manner biased against acquaintance rape. Allowing admission under existing
FRE 404(b), however, does not stigmatize a rape defendant more than other
criminal defendants subject to similar uses of evidence. It also has the added
advantage of eradicating the new rules' formalization of the crazed rapist
myth. Moreover, to avoid disparate treatment of offenders, we could require of
judges written opinions that set forth particularized (and therefore reviewable)
justifications for admissions of past bad acts evidence. 30 5 This, coupled with
judicial education regarding rape stereotypes and motives for rape, should
temper existing biases. 30 6
4. The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Action
VAWA's civil rights action is perhaps the most salvageable of the recently-
enacted rape initiatives. Its effort to expand remedies for rape by providing a
federal cause of action recognizes states' abysmal record of rape prosecution,
including the invidious myths precluding acquaintance rape prosecution. To
that extent, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison,30 7
striking down the civil rights action as beyond Congress' powers, though
defendants and in magnifying unfair prejudice.").
305 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 612-14 (proposing that judges be required to
include different motive typologies, and reasons for admitting prior bad acts evidence in
rape cases, in written opinions, thus enabling appellate "supervision" and effective review).
306 Professor Park has urged that states adopt rules similar to FRE 413-415 but only in
those cases where consent is a defense-essentially, in acquaintance rape cases. See Roger
C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right
About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995). Park makes this
argument because in consent defense cases, the accused does not dispute that he had a
sexual encounter with the complainant. There is thus no danger that the character evidence
will convict an otherwise innocent defendant, or that the person "who actually committed
the crime will go free." Id. at 273; see also id. at 275-76.
Professor Park's proposal is obviously feminist in that it aims to increase our
understanding and prosecution of acquaintance rape. It also cures some of the problems
with "rounding up the usual suspects" because the prosecution will not center around trying
to identify a stranger who has raped before - the kind of case most likely to impact
disparately men already familiar with the criminal justice system. See id. at 273-74.
Furthermore, by focusing only on acquaintance rape, Park's proposed rule emphasizes the
seriousness of that crime and arguably avoids court attempts to treat acquaintance rapists
more leniently after comparison with paradigmatic stranger rapists. However, the existence
of a rule aimed only at the crime of rape reinforces the myth that men who rape are more
mentally deviant than other criminals and could detract from the benefits of Park's proposed
rule or the feminist agenda generally. Because evidence of past convictions could be
admissible under the "absence of mistake" exception in FRE 404(b), a neutral rule which
does not reinforce sex offender stereotypes, we prefer it to Park's proposal. His proposal is,
however, preferable to the existing rules.
307 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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predictable, is unfortunate. 30 8 If the Supreme Court reverses Morrison,3°9 we
believe that a federal cause of action would substantially benefit the feminist
agenda. In the meantime, of course, there exist similar discrimination and bias
crime initiatives at the state level which may also benefit the feminist agenda.
In order to benefit that agenda, however, we must amend certain aspects of
VAWA (and any similar state laws). Most importantly, all language referring
to "animus" should be deleted. Although generally a term indicating the
presence of intentional discrimination, "animus" is too easily equated with
hatred and ill-will and may encourage courts and juries to reject acquaintance
rape claims which do not appear to be so motivated. A more appropriate
approach would use the "because of gender" language originally proposed for
VAWA. That language, however, is also problematic. As we discussed
earlier, using language based in a bias/discrimination paradigm may still
encourage judges and juries to distinguish between rapes manifesting "hate"
and those that do not. The "because of gender" language, however, does not
explicitly reinforce notions of hate as does the term "animus."
Moreover, a few simple modifications to VAWA will alleviate much of the
potential bias against acquaintance rape identified above. VAWA should carve
out rape from other gender-based assaults and treat the "because of gender"
requirement as satisfied in civil rights actions based upon rape. Because there
is nothing inherently gendered in a non-rape physical assault on a woman,
requiring a showing of gender-motivation is sensible. Rape, however, is a
crime heavily entangled with gender or gender hierarchies. There is no need to
require that a woman prove anything beyond the fact of the rape itself. In rare
cases, of course, a rape may not be about gender.310 Recognizing this fact,
some scholars propose that civil rights actions based upon rape cases should
308 For a feminist critique of the federalism arguments raised in opposition to VAWA's
civil rights action, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1297 (1998) (discussing federalism and "localism" as they related to family
law specifically). See also Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245.
309 The decision's close nature suggests that future courts may be willing to re-examine
it. Four justices, Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, argued that VAWA was an
acceptable exercise of congressional powers. See 120 S. Ct. at 1774 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
310 As the Anisimov court noted, there are likely to be few instances where a rape is not
gender-motivated. See supra note 259. One scholar has suggested a few possible examples,
including that the offender "did not care if his victim was a man or a woman, that he had a
history of assaulting people of either gender, or that he is psychologically predisposed to
sexually assault people of either gender." Willis, supra note 273, at 2221-22. We agree that
an offender who rapes men and women interchangeably may not show the requisite gender
motivation. However, we note that men often are harassed or sexually assaulted by other
men in ways that reflect evidence of gender hierarchies which greatly resemble male-female
relationships. Cf Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998)
(holding that male workers' sexual harassment of male co-worker was actionable under
Title VII). Such rapes may be motivated by gender even if the rapist has male and female
victims.
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contain a rebuttable presumption that the rape occurred "because of gender."'31
Adoption of these or similar proposals, coupled with instructions to the jury or
expert testimony regarding the nature of rape and rape motivations, is fair to
the defendant and does not reinforce the crazed rapist myth in a manner which
weakens the feminist agenda.
CONCLUSION
We are not so naive as to think that our prescriptions will eradicate the myth
of the crazed rapist. Beliefs so deeply held do not instantaneously disappear
simply because laws embracing them no longer exist. We do believe,
however, that repeal or substantial alteration of the new legislation is a step in
the right direction. Such action recognizes the invidious power of the myth
and, at the very least, avoids giving it the law's formal sanction. As a result,
we can better promote feminist attempts to broaden our understanding and
prosecution of rape. Earlier feminist reform efforts revealed that it is not
enough to enact laws about rape; legislatures must enact the right laws. Our
suggestions attempt to steer legislatures back onto the right path regarding rape
initiatives.
3" See Gaffney, supra note 273, at 286 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court advocates that
the concept of a rebuttable presumption is useful in discrimination cases," and that because
VAWA provides a discrimination remedy (the civil rights remedy), "a rebuttable
presumption... would similarly be useful"); Willis, supra note 273, at 2221-22 (arguing
that "[o]nce a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a sexual assault
occurred, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the assault was motivated by gender,"
and that "[iun the few cases where the sexual assault is not based on gender, the defendant
should be allowed to rebut the presumption of gender motivation").
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